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A Constructivist Analysis of Taiwan’s Democratization: structural problems and external factors (1991-2001)

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Dedico a minha mãe, uma contadora de histórias que está sempre a fantasiar grandes filhos.
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First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my mom. She is a storyteller who dreamed about a great son. She tells everyone she meets about how proud she is of me. Along with the conclusion of this work, I hope I got a step closer to her dream as well as to her generous words of admiration.

I also would like to thank my father, who taught me perseverance – a value I will carry with me for the rest of my life.

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“Um contador de histórias é justamente o contrário do historiador, não sendo um historiador, afinal de contas, mais do que um contador de história. Por que essa diferença? Simples, leitor, nada mais simples. O historiador foi inventado por ti, homem culto, letrado, humanista; o contador de histórias foi inventado pelo povo, nunca leu Tito Lívio, e entende que contar o que se passou é só fantasiar.”

(Machado de Assis)
ABSTRACT


Since scholars such as Samuel P. Huntington claim that some cultures such as the Islam and the Confucianism are hostile to democracy, this work attempted to find out why Taiwan became a democracy despite this cultural obstacle. Therefore, this study’s objective was to understand why democratization can thrive in civilizations hostile to democracy. Aiming to accomplish such a task, this research used the explanatory case study as methodology. In this sense, it sought a causal link between some external factors and the democratization in Taiwan from 1991 to 2001. By using Alexander Wendt’s constructivism, this work addressed Taiwan’s personal identity and interests and investigated the changing in Taiwan’s type identity – from authoritarianism to democracy. In addition, it labeled the problems that Confucianism pose to democracy as structural problems. Similarly, the external factors considered in this study were the ones with regard to the China’s Hobbesian environment as well as the United States Lockean anarchy, both concerning Taiwan. Initially, this research’s hypothesis was that the more Taiwan become democratic, the more it will benefit from the Lockean culture, and the less it will suffer from the Hobbesian anarchy. This hypothesis was partially confirmed. On the one hand, Taiwan’s democratization really brought advantages to it coming from the Lockean culture. However, on the other hand, China perceives democracy in Taiwan as a threat to its sovereignty and, consequently, Taiwan’s democratization does not alleviate the tensions concerning the Hobbesian culture. Finally, this work proposes an alternative hypothesis to explain cases similar to the one of Taiwan based in the Wendtian framework.

Key words: Democracy; Confucianism; constructivism; external factors
RESUMEN

Hay expertos, como Samuel P. Huntington, que afirman que algunas culturas como el islamismo y el confucianismo son hostiles a la democracia. Teniendo en cuenta esta afirmación, este trabajo averiguó por qué Taiwán se convirtió en una democracia a pesar de ese obstáculo cultural. Por lo tanto, el objetivo de este estudio fue entender por qué la democratización puede desarrollarse en civilizaciones hostiles a la democracia. Para cumplir con este objetivo, esta investigación utilizó el estudio de caso explicativo como metodología. En este sentido, se buscó un nexo causal entre factores externos y la democratización en Taiwán de 1991 a 2001. Al utilizar el constructivismo de Alexander Wendt como teoría, este estudio abordó la identidad y los intereses de Taiwán e investigó la alteración de su identidad de tipo, que cambió de autoritarismo a la democracia. Además, este trabajo clasificó los problemas que el confucianismo plantea a la democracia como problemas estructurales. De la misma forma, los factores externos considerados en este estudio fueron aquellos relacionados al ambiente hobbesiano de China y a la anarquía lockeana de Estados Unidos, ambos relacionados a Taiwán. Inicialmente, la hipótesis de esta investigación era que cuanto más Taiwán se democratizar, más este actor se beneficiará de la cultura lockeana y menos sufrirá con la anarquía hobbesiana. Esta hipótesis se ha confirmado parcialmente. Por un lado, la democratización de Taiwán realmente traía ventajas típicas de la cultura lockeana. Sin embargo, por otro lado, China percibe la democracia en Taiwán como una amenaza a su soberanía y, consecuentemente, la democratización de Taiwán no alivia las tensiones relacionadas con la cultura hobbesiana. Finalmente, este trabajo propone una hipótesis alternativa para explicar casos similares a los de Taiwán, basada en el modelo de Wendt.

Palabras clave: democracia; confucionismo; constructivismo; factores externos
RESUMO

Autores como Samuel P. Huntington afirmam que algumas culturas como o islamismo e o confucionismo são hostis à democracia. Dado tal afirmação, este artigo buscou descobrir por que Taiwan se tornou uma democracia apesar desse obstáculo cultural. Portanto, o objetivo deste estudo foi entender por que a democratização pode se desenvolver em civilizações hostis à democracia. Para cumprir com este objetivo, esta pesquisa utilizou o estudo de caso explicativo como metodologia. Nesse sentido, buscou-se um nexo de causalidade entre fatores externos e a democratização em Taiwan de 1991 a 2001. Ao utilizar o construtivismo de Alexander Wendt como teoria, este estudo abordou a identidade e os interesses de Taiwan e investigou a alteração de sua identidade de tipo, que mudou de autoritarismo para democracia. Além disso, este trabalho classificou os problemas que o confucionismo coloca à democracia como problemas estruturais. Da mesma forma, os fatores externos considerados neste estudo foram aqueles relacionados ao ambiente hobbesiano da China e à anarquia lockeana dos Estados Unidos, ambos relacionados a Taiwan. Inicialmente, a hipótese desta pesquisa era que quanto mais Taiwan se democratizar, mais este ator se beneficiará da cultura lockeana e menos sofrerá com a anarquia hobbesiana. Esta hipótese foi parcialmente confirmada. Por um lado, a democratização de Taiwan realmente trouxe vantagens típicas da cultura lockeana. No entanto, por outro lado, a China percebe a democracia em Taiwan como uma ameaça à sua soberania e, consequentemente, a democratização de Taiwan não alivia as tensões relacionadas à cultura hobbesiana. Finalmente, este trabalho propôs uma hipótese alternativa para explicar casos semelhantes aos de Taiwan, baseada no modelo de Wendt.

Palavras-chave: democracia; confucionismo; construtivismo; fatores externos
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Democratic Progressive Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang (or the Nationalist Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<td>TRA</td>
<td>Taiwan Relations Act</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Democracy has undoubtedly been a driving force in international politics. Accordingly, States’ legitimacy is closely related to the extent they fit into type identity criteria. These criteria change over time due to historical processes and systemic cultural transformations. During the 1990s, the period under analysis in this work (more precisely, from 1991 to 2001), democracy and capitalism turned into dominant forms of states’ type identities. This world liberal face promises not only peace, since democracies do not go to war with each other, but they also promote humans right, facilitate investment and trade, protect civil liberties, provide tools to fight corruption, boost social agendas, ease the creation of employment and income, foster transparency and so on. Given this context, a high quality in a state’s democracy can enhance its international image (WENDT, 1999).

The prestige of democratic regimes in front of many states of the international system is an external factor - a reflection of the so-called Lockean culture, that one mostly based on a prevailing scenario of rivalry amongst its units (WENDT, 1999). Another external factor is the encouragement of democratization by global powers. In this regard, global players such as the United States (U.S.) and the European Community advocated for democratization in many states in the 1990s. To these actors, democratic values are important and, as a result, they keep pursuing to spread it to the world even today. This democratic movement, however, did not start in the 1990s. From 1974 to 1990, at least 30 countries made transitions to democracy, which doubled the number of democratic governments in the world (HUNTINGTON, 1991; 1996).

Most of the democratic transitions that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s were of states that had a mostly Catholic population; consequently, it was overwhelmingly a Catholic wave. Concerning Protestant countries, by the early 1970s, many of them had already become democracies. Therefore, there is a strong correlation between Western Christianity and democracy. Although there are others relevant variables that experts on democratization usually take into account, like economic development for example, religion tends to be the dominant variable in non-Western civilizations. To many scholars, both economy and religion are related to culture, and there are cultures hostile to democracy. In this sense, Taiwan in the late 1980s had already achieved economic standards need to democratization but it was not a democracy yet due to its Confucian civilization (HUNTINGTON, 1991).

1 As will be explained in chapter one, the type identity is a social category in which actors share characteristics. With regard to states, type identities correspond to “forms of states” such as capitalist states, fascist states, democratic states, monarchical states, and so on.
Nevertheless, by any measure, Taiwan was a democracy in 2001 (DIAMOND, 2001), what makes it an emblematic case study. Thus, what happened to the argument of incompatibility of democracy and Confucianism? Since Confucianism presents structural problems to democratization, why did Taiwan become democratic? In other words - why did Taiwan become a democracy despite the cultural obstacles to implementing it in a Confucian civilization? - which is this study’s research question. In search for answers, and based on a Constructivist approach, this work consider as its starting point the following relational hypothesis to be tested henceforth: **The more Taiwan become democratic, the more it will benefit from the Lockean culture, and the less it will suffer from the Hobbesian anarchy.**

In order to answer its research question, the objective of this work is, firstly, to understand democratization in civilizations hostile to democracy. The specific objectives that derive from this general objective are 1) to understand Taiwan’s identity through a constructivist perspective; 2) to demonstrate structural problems obstructs Taiwan’s democratization and 3) to understand the role of external factors on Taiwan’s democratization.

As dependent variable, this work defined: **Democratization in civilizations hostile to democracy.** And, as independent variables, three were selected: 1) Taiwan’s identity and interests - personal and type identities and interests; 2) the Hobbesian culture - especially with regard to China and 3) The Lockean culture - especially with regard to the United States. Finally, the intervening variable of this work is changes in the distribution of knowledge within a civilization capable of altering its relation with other ideas.

To accomplish these goals, this research design, appropriately defined as an explanatory case study - for trying to find out causal links between variables still poorly explored - can be summarized as follows:
Note that the general objective and the dependent variable are quite similar. For this reason, only the dependent variable appears in the research design. This research proposal is developed through three chapters. The first chapter will present a constructivist ontology on Taiwan’s identity. In this sense, it will argue that the ontology of social kinds is made primarily by ideas. The ideas that matter for answering the research question of this study are the Huntingtonian concept of civilization, and the Wendtian ideas on states’ identities and interests as well as the influence of cultures of anarchy - thus taking a holistic or systemic approach.

The second chapter demonstrates some features of Confucianism that pose structural problems to democratization. In this regard, after presenting Huntington’s definition of democracy and democratic values, this work attempts to verify his argument about the incompatibility between Confucianism and democracy. In order to advance in this verification, chapter two evaluates three kinds of arguments: The compatibility, incompatibility, and convergence arguments. The third chapter analyses the role of external factors in Taiwan’s move toward democratization. Therefore, it explains Taiwan’s personal identity and interest more deeply, then, it develops an inquiry on how Hobbesian and Lockean
cultures have influenced Taiwan to change its type identity from an authoritarian regime to a relatively liberal democracy from 1991 to 2001.

Finally, considering that democracy has become very important for understanding many issues of international politics today, chapter three is aimed at shedding some light on the (in) compatibility amongst democracy and the Confucian or Sinic civilization. In this regard, to understand how Confucian states such as China, Taiwan, South and North Korea, Singapore and so on, organize themselves politically is not only important today but it will be even more important in the future.

In the end, it is expected that the inferences obtained collaborate to the existing literature on the relationship between democracy and Confucianism by providing a well-founded analysis based on ontological and epistemological aspects of this phenomenon by using a social theory of international politics.
CHAPTER 1: A CONSTRUCTIVIST ONTOLOGY ON TAIWAN'S IDENTITY

This chapter aims at explaining why ideas matter when it comes to International Relations (IR). The main reason for establishing such a goal is due to the research question of this work - why did Taiwan turn into a democracy despite the cultural obstacles for implementing it in a Confucian society? This research question suggests, at least, two premises. First, it suggests that culture - or ideas\(^2\) - matters for the democratization of a country. Second, it implies that Confucianism and democracy are ideas with a certain level of antagonism, thus conferring some level of validity to the causal link between democracy and religious systems originally presented by Samuel Huntington. This chapter, therefore, attempts to develop the first assumption while the second chapter will address the second one.

In order to explain the importance of ideas in IR, this chapter will work on the following strategy: (1) to present Alexander Wendt’s constructivism - the main theoretical framework of this work - to demonstrate the materiality of social structures; and then (2) to analyze the concepts of civilization, identity and of the culture of an anarchical international system under a constructivist perspective. In this regard, determining the power and the limits that ideas have on the international system is important for the comprehension of Taiwan’s democratization case. So do is to consider the Taiwan’s identity – as well as with its Confucianist feature - and the culture of the international system as independent variables. To accomplish this task, the next section, from a constructivist perspective, will approach the theme of what the structure of IR is made of, that is to say, its ontology.

1.1 TO WHAT EXTENT STRUCTURES ARE MADE OF IDEAS? THE ONTOLOGY OF IR’S FIELD

In *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999), Alexander Wendt raises a question concerning the extent to which structures are made of ideas. His interest is in inquiring about the structure’s ontology. He asks if the social system is ideas all the way down, and he concludes that is not. In his view, “it cannot be ideas all the way down because scientific realism shows that ideas are based on and are regulated by an independently existing physical reality.” (WENDT, 1999, p. 110). In Wendt’s understanding the scientific realism, a philosophy of science is an adequate approach to address nature, not social kinds. Social

\(^2\) To Wendt (1999), domestic culture is ideas too; ideas, however, are not only culture.
theory suits better social kinds. In this sense, as he contends, any social system will contain
three elements, which are material conditions, interests, and ideas; and without material
conditions, there is no reality at all.

According to Wendt (1999), scientific realism claims that the world exists independent
of human beings. In this perspective, subject and object are distinct, and both can be
discovered through science. Thus, the bottom line of scientific realism is opposition to the
idea that what there is in the world - that is its ontology - is somehow dependent on what
people know or believe - its epistemology. Representing a via media position in the way of
explaining reality, Wendt argues that even though scientific realism can know nature, it
cannot know society. In his interpretation, unlike natural kinds, social phenomena are
constituted mostly by people's ideas, which seems to vitiate the subject-object distinction
upon which the causal theory of reference depends.

In this respect, Wendt (1999) states that realism about natural science is based on a
materialist ontology, whereas the nature of social kinds seems to imply an idealist one. As a
result, the ontology of social phenomena, and consequently of IR, according to this vision, are
ideas. When it comes to IR's field, it is ideas almost all the way down. As he puts it: “Without
ideas there are no interests, without interests there are no meaningful material conditions,
without material conditions there is no reality at all.” (WENDT, 1999, p. 139). Nevertheless,
when dealing with IR, how to define material conditions, ideas, and interests, which are the
three elements that integrate any social system?

In accordance with Wendt (1999), in general, theories grounded in a materialist
perception of reality holds at least five material factors in common, namely, human nature,
natural resources, geography, forces of production, and forces of destruction. For materialists,
these material forces affect the world in many ways, permitting the manipulation of the world,
empowering some actors over others, disposing people toward aggression, creating threats are
just some few of them. Conversely, in Wendt’s view, though important because it supports
reality, material forces explain relatively little of international politics. For instance, material
force helps to constitute interests in human nature, however, the most representative drive for
human actions - in international politics - are schemas and deliberations, which are in turn
constituted by shared ideas or culture, in other words, they are cognitions, not biology.

Moreover, Wendt (1999) defends that material forces or material conditions cannot be
strictly separated from ideas. In addition, although he acknowledges that material forces
constrain and enable social forms at the margin, this is due to the fact that the distribution of
ideas helps to constitute the meaning of power. This leads to the conclusion that Wendt’s
constructivism is idealistic rather than materialist and, consequently, it has two basic tenets. First, structures of human association, like states, international organizations, political parties and so on, are determined primarily by shared ideas, not material forces. Second, identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas - through the distribution of knowledge within a structure - rather than given by nature. Since ideas and interests give meaning to material conditions, this work will put much more effort in explaining them.

To understand the idealist feature of Wendt’s constructivism is important, but another important aspect of his theory is its holism or structuralism. Holism, as Wendt (1999) argues, opposes the individualist view that social structures are reducible to individuals. According to him, individualism believes that social scientific explanations should be reducible to the properties or interactions of independently existing individuals, or states, taking into consideration the unit of analysis of this research. For him, holism, on the other hand, holds that the effects of social structures on agents can be both causal and constitutive, therefore, social outcomes cannot be reduced to an analysis of independently existing agents and their interactions.

Nevertheless, the main disagreement between individualists and holists, in Wendt’s understanding (1999), concerns the extent to which structures construct agents. On the one hand, holists believe that the difference that structures make is high, and they also construct agents. On the other hand, individualists hold that the difference that structures make is low, and they cannot construct agents. In this regard, the difference could be summarized as follows “To say that a structure ‘constrains’ actors [individualist approach] is to say that it only has behavioral effects.” (WENDT, 1999, p. 26). By contrast, “To say that a structure “constructs” actors [holistic approach] is to say that it has property effects.” (WENDT, 1999, p. 26). Wendt acknowledges both constitutive and causal effects for the structure, whether in its micro or macro sense.

3 According to Wendt (1999), not only humans are purposive actors, but states have this quality too. In his words, “states are real actors to which we can legitimately attribute anthropomorphic qualities like desires, beliefs, and intentionality.” (WENDT, 1999, p. 197)

4 Despite this general view, Wendt (1999) acknowledges that individualist theories like Liberalism and, to a lesser extent, Neoliberalism grant much importance to ideas.

5 Wendt (1999) supports the constitutive elements of structure with more emphasis than its causal aspects. However, he describes both as important in the sense that thinking in a causal manner helps to answer “why” and “how” questions; and “how-possible” and “what” questions are better addressed by using a constitutive approach. Furthermore, structures constructs agents such a way that it is easier to predict state’s behaviour than human’s.
Finally, two important considerations must be retained at the end of this section. The first one is that ideas matter in order to understand social phenomena in international relations. An idealist view of international politics is not only feasible but it is also appropriate since social constructs of humankind have a great weight in interfering in social reality. Second, holism, and not individualism, is an adequate approach to social science. Indeed, social structures affect agents both constitutive and causally. After these considerations, the next section will focus on the concept of civilization in order to prepare the ground for understanding some shared beliefs in the Confucian society in the second chapter. Furthermore, it will also focus on agent’s properties, which is its identities and interests, and the culture of the international system.

1.2 CIVILIZATION, IDENTITY AND CULTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Considering the ontology of IR discussed in the previous section, the next step for answering this paper’s research question is to define in which areas ideas related with the object of study of this work is relevant. This paper selected three areas from where gathering data is essential in order to accomplish this work’s goals. The first is the idea of civilization borrowed from Samuel P. Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of world order* (1996). The second and the third ones - the concepts of identity and culture of the international system - come from Wendt’s *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999).

The criteria for choosing such areas has to do with some cautions that a scholar must take when dealing with constructivism to explain social phenomena in international politics. Wendt (1999) advocates that constructivism is not a theory of international politics and, given that, he suggests that before using it in this field it is mandatory to select agents and the structures in which they are embedded. The main agent of this study is Taiwan. Understanding its feature as a Confucianist civilization and its identity in Wendt’s perspective is indispensable for the sake of answering the research question of this research. Moreover, to bring Wendt’s view on the culture of the international system in which Taiwan is embedded in is important too. As a result, the next topic will start with the ideas concerning civilization.

1.2.1 Huntington’s Concept of Civilization

Before going any further in understanding Huntington's conceptualization of the term civilization, it is important to know what he writes about what he calls a model or map for
social science. This decision was taken due to the fact that his term “civilizations”, as well as the supposed clash among them, has received many critics - positives and negatives - since his article was published in 1993. Thus, on this subject, Huntington (1996) argues that every model or map is an abstraction and will be more useful for some objectives than for others. According to him, people need a map capable of both portraying reality and simplifying reality in a way that best serves their purposes.

In addition, Huntington (1996) advocates that a model is a tool that works for a better understanding of reality in at least five points. First, it helps in ordering and generalizing reality. Second, this tool facilitates to understand causal relationships among phenomena. Third, it helps to anticipate and even predict future developments. Fourth, a model is good for distinguishing what is important from what is unimportant. Finally, it shows what paths one should take in order to achieve its goals. Huntington, then, observes that several maps or paradigms of world politics were advanced at the end of the Cold War, and his map on the clash of civilizations is one of them.

As a model of interpreting reality, Huntington's clash of civilizations has suffered critics such as of being oversimplified and overgeneralized (SAID, 2001). In fact, his ideas are constantly going up and down in accordance with the political atmosphere of the moment. In this regard, some authors support the idea that the emergence of non-Western peoples in the new global arena should transform world structures and open new potentials for peace and progress (MCLEAN, 2002). Besides, other scholars claim that Huntington is incorrect in theory in the sense that the main source of conflict is the scramble for interests in terms of territory, wealth, resources and power, not culture and religion (YU, 2002).

Conversely, there is a vast literature that suggests clashes among civilizations in the coming years. When it comes to terrorism, Wilkinson (2011) claims that fundamentalism in Islam is promoting a “holy war” against democracy. By including other sources of conflict between civilizations than just culture, the number of clashes increases even more. For instance, there is the case of Thucydides Trap\textsuperscript{6}, a hypothesis developed by Allison (2015). Arguments are strong in both sides of the dispute, and although it is not possible to be certain about whether clash or cooperation among civilizations predominates in contemporary politics, Huntington's definition of the term civilization seems to be helpful since the object of study of this work is democracy in Taiwan.

\textsuperscript{6} In article, Allison (2015) defines the Thucydides Trap as the likelihood of war when a rising power is threatening to displace a ruling power.
Huntington (1996) points out six aspects of civilization aiming at defining it. The first one is to address civilization in the plural, not in the singular. According to him, eighteenth-century French thinkers developed civilization in the singular as the opposite of the concept of barbarism. In that regard, the idea of civilization provided a standard by which to judge other societies - to be civilized was good, to be uncivilized was bad. Thus, Huntington assumes that there is no universal civilization, all civilizations are unique in some sense, and given that, the term, as a concept, must be understood in its plurality - civilizations.

The second aspect is that civilizations are cultural entities. In this matter, both civilization and culture refer to the overall way of life of a people, and a civilization is a culture writ large. Culture and civilization involve modes of thinking, values, norms, institutions, and so on. To the Greeks, civilization was linked to blood, language, religion, and way of life. Nevertheless, of all the objective elements which define civilizations, the most important usually is religion” (HUNTINGTON, 1996).

The third aspect pointed out by Huntington (1996) is that civilizations are comprehensive, that is, none of their constituent units can be fully understood without reference to the encompassing civilization. Thus a civilization is a “totality”, and it has a certain degree of integration. Fourth, civilizations cease to exist, however, they are also very long-lived. In this respect, they evolve, adapt, and are the most enduring of human associations. As Huntington (1996, p. 43) puts it: “Empires rise and fall, governments come and go, civilizations remain.” In this sense, civilizations are able to survive political, social, economic and ideological disorders in such a way those empires or governments cannot.

The fifth feature of civilizations that Huntington (1996) indicates is that civilizations are cultural entities, not political ones. As a consequence, differently from governments, they are not ought to maintain order, establish justice, collect taxes, fight wars, negotiate treaties Nonetheless, a civilization may contain one or many political units. The last one concerns the identification of the major civilizations in history. According to Huntington, the experts differ only in the number of the major civilizations and not in their identity. Thus, to him, the major contemporary civilizations are the Sinic, the Japanese, the Hindu, the Islamic, the Orthodox, the Western, the Latin American and, possibly, the African.

Huntington (1996) also adds that, while on the one hand cultural commonality among civilizations facilitates cooperation and cohesion, on the other hand, cultural differences between them promote cleavages and conflicts. And that occurs, as he explains, for five reasons. “First, everyone has multiple identities which may compete with or reinforce each other: kinship, occupational, cultural, institutional, territorial, educational, partisan,
ideological, and others.” (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 128) Given the dimension of a civilization, unshared values enhance the likelihood of conflict and shared ones can facilitate cooperation.

The second reason raised by Huntington (1996) concerns the impact of social-economic modernization. This modernization has created a dislocation and alienation for individuals, and as a consequence, the need for more meaningful identities. This explains why non-Western societies, facing Western cultural influence, stimulate the revitalization of their indigenous identities and culture. The third one pointed out by Huntington is his acknowledgment that at any level can only be defined in relation to an “other”, that is, a different person, tribe, race, or civilization. And these differences generate behaviors such as feelings of superiority (and occasionally inferiority) toward people who are perceived as being very different and fear of and lack of trust in such people.

As a fourth reason, Huntington (1996) claims that the sources of conflict between states and groups from different civilizations are, in large measure, those that have always generated conflict between groups. These sources are in general control of people, territory, wealth, and resources, and relative power - which he defines as the group’s ability to impose its own values, culture, and institutions on another group as compared to that group’s ability to do that in reverse. Finally, the fifth is the ubiquity of conflict. Huntington (1996) affirms that it is human to hate. As he contends, for self-definition and motivation people need enemies: competitors in business, rivals in achievement, and opponents in politics. And this aspect of human nature leads to conflict.

By interpreting Taiwan under Huntington's perspective, one should predict a climate of cooperation dominating the relation between China and Taiwan, since they belong to the same civilization. Both China and Taiwan are a Confucianist civilization. In this regard, they share the value system of Confucianism such as the attention they give to thrift, family, work, and discipline with most countries of the region. Besides, in its political aspect, Confucianism highlight the values of authority, hierarchy, the subordination of individual rights and interests, the importance of consensus, the avoidance of confrontation and, in general, the supremacy of the state over society and of society over the individual. In fact, perhaps because of these shared values, the prospects of Chinese fighting Chinese are higher, but still limited, unless the Taiwanese constitute an independent Republic (HUNTINGTON, 1996).

7 Huntington, in his article published in 1993, labeled the Chinese civilization as Confucianist civilization. In his book, however, he changed it to Sinic civilization. This research uses the old term. That is due mainly to the research questions that it addresses. The selection, however, is not arbitrary. In this respect, Huntington (1996) observes that in the 1990s the Taiwanese government declared itself to be “the inheritor of Confucian thought”. Moreover, Hwa (1993) argues that Confucianism defines the quintessence of Sinism.
But a deeper analysis of Taiwan-China’s relation should highlight its clashes. These clashes may be happening because Taiwan is acquiring new values, it is changing its identity. Confucian values, according to Huntington (1996), contrast with the primacy in American beliefs of liberty, equality, democracy, and individualism. And despite the fact of Taiwan being a Confucianist civilization, it has Western features. In this line, Diamond (2001) advocates that by any measure, Taiwan is a democracy. In his view, it has regular, free, and fair elections to determine who will exercise government power, and these elections are meaningful, in that victory at the polls confers real power on the winning party. Moreover, he argues that by global standards, Taiwan also has a relatively liberal democracy in the sense that its press is quite free and competitive.

Taiwan is moving toward Western values and, taking this into account, it could be considered a torn country. Huntington (1996) defines as torn countries those attempting to affiliate with another civilization. According to him, at least three requirements must be met for a torn country to redefine its civilizational identity. The first concerns the political and economic elite of the country, which has to be generally supportive of this move. The second involves the domestic sphere, thus the public has to be at least willing to acquiesce in the redefinition of identity. The last one is related to the host civilization, in which its dominant elements have to be willing to embrace the convert.

This research, however, is not about whether Taiwan meets the requirements for redefining its civilizational identity or not, but instead, it is about the reason of Taiwan be willing to make the transition toward West’s values, from 1991 to 2001, in the first place. In order to address this question, this study chose a constructivist approach. Thus, the next two sections will deal with the concepts of identity and culture of the international system, both under a Wendtian perspective. This view differs from the presented in this section in many aspects. Perhaps the most important one, with respect to the research question of this work, is that Wendt (1999) assumes that his theory is state-centric.

1.2.2 Identity and Interests

When Wendt (1999) refers to identity and interests in his book, he is taking into account primarily the state. According to him, “since states are the dominant form of subjectivity in contemporary world politics this means that they should be the primary unit of analysis for thinking about the global regulation of violence” (1999, p. 9). In addition, he argues that the most important causal chains in international politics are linked with states and
even the possibilities of change in the system happen through them. In this regard, this section will keep with this way of thinking and will present Wendt’s theory seeking gather information about Taiwan’s identity and interest. Therefore, the unit of analysis of this study is the state “Taiwan”, not the Confucianist civilization, which is being investigated here with the only purpose of informing about important shared values within Taiwan.

In accordance with Wendt (1999), another important feature of the state, to better understand this state-centric approach, is its anthropomorphic qualities. He claims that states are “people” too and that this affects the nature of the international system. He agrees with Carr (2001) that it would be impossible to make sense of day-to-day IR without attributions of corporate actorhood. In fact, Carr (2001) observes that this anthropomorphization of the state date back to Hobbes when he calls the Leviathan an “artificial man”, and thus makes a path for the International Law. As a consequence, the Wendt’s constructivist perspective is not only state-centric but also anthropomorphizes the state.

To Wendt (1999), states have four kinds of identity, namely, (1) personal or corporate, (2) type, (3) role, and (4) collective. The personal identities are constituted by the self-organizing, homeostatic structures that make actors distinct entities. States, according to this view, need joint narratives of its members and, in this sense, the state is a “group Self” capable of group-level cognition. Moreover, personal and corporate identities are constitutionally exogenous to Otherness since the Ideas of Self regarding the state have an auto-genetic quality. States have personal identity given its consciousness and memory of Self as a separate locus of thought and activity.

Wendt (1999) points out that what defines states as such and then grant to them their quality of being a state is a set of five properties: (1) an institutional-legal order, (2) an organization claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, (3) an organization with sovereignty, (4) a society, and (5) territory. In the past, Taiwan had all these five requisites for having a personal identity as a state (KISSINGER, 2011). But today, Taiwan’ status is controversial, especially in what concerns its sovereignty. Some authors still argue that by any objective measure, Taiwan is an independent sovereign state (RIPLEY, 2002). According to Ripley (2002), Taiwan emerged as an “Asian Tiger” with the quintessential combination of a high-growth economy and authoritarian political structure.

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8 Despite Wendt’s anthropomorphization of the state, he enumerates three problems that he sees with this approach. First, corporate agents are less unitary than individual ones. Second, precisely because of this pluralist characteristic of the states, it is easier to assess the intentions and therefore predict the behavior of states than it is of individuals. Finally, states have alternatives to “interaction” that people do not. (WENDT, 1999).

9 The use of corporate identity for organizations is more accurate (WENDT, 1999).
however, during the 1990s, Taiwan got a better position to call for its national self-
determination.

Although there are problems concerning the status of Taiwan, it acts as a *de facto*
independent state (KUNITIĆ, 2015). Its *de facto* independence characterizes its personal
identity. Thus Taiwan *de facto* has its own society, territory, an institutional-legal order, an
organization claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, and enjoy
rights as a sovereign state. In Wendt’s theory (1999), this personal identity is a platform or
site for others identities. In this regard, the second identity - type - is related to the personal
identity. The type identity is a social category in which actors share characteristics. These
shared characteristics must have social content or meaning, and this content is social in a way
that it is given by more or less formal membership rules that orient the behavior of Others
toward it.

Wendt (1999) claims that the membership rules define what counts as a type identity
and that these rules vary culturally and historically. As such, as he argues that type identities
have an inherently cultural dimension that poses problems for methodological individualism.
Besides, the characteristics that underlie type identities are at base intrinsic to actors. For
instance, when dealing with states system, Wendt contends that the type identities correspond
to “regime types” or “forms of states” like capitalist states, fascist states, monarchical states,
and so on.

Furthermore, Wendt (1999) argues that forms of state are constituted by internal
principles of political legitimacy that organize state-society relations with respect to
ownership and control of the means of production and destruction. According to him, these
principles may be caused by interaction with other states, however, in a constitutive sense,
they are exogenous to the state's system because they do not depend on other states for their
existence. As he exemplifies, Japan became a democracy after 1945 because it was occupied
by the United States but it remained democratic all by itself.

Conversely, Wendt (1999) states that not all shared characteristics become type
identities. For instance, two states may have identical parliamentary systems but in the
contemporary states system, this category is not meaningful. Yet, as he argues, states with
presidential and parliamentary systems can be constituted in that system with the same type
identity as democratic. Moreover, the meaning of the identity “democratic state” is changing
as states begin to internalize the belief that democratic states do not make war on each other.
Thus the answer to the research question of this work is related to which circumstances
influenced Taiwan to make the transition to democracy, that is, to change its type identity.
The third kind of identity - the role identity - will be little explored in this work. Notwithstanding, Wendt (1999) presents role identities as those that take the dependency on culture and thus Others one step further if compared with personal and type identities. As he puts it, whereas the characteristics that give rise to type identities are pre-social, role identities are not based on intrinsic properties and as such exists only in relation to Others. For this reason, one cannot enact role identities by oneself, and this identity is facilitated by the fact that many roles are institutionalized in social structures that pre-date particular interactions. As a consequence, an institution arranges functions in which actors like states perform and this institution generates expectations about an actor’s behavior.\(^{10}\)

Finally, the collective identity, as Wendt (1999) contends, takes the relationship between Self and Other to its logical conclusion, identification. According to him, identification is a cognitive process in which the Self-Other distinction becomes obscure and at the limit transcended altogether; the Self, in this sense is “categorized” as Other. Making a parallel with Huntington’s theory (1996), collective identity could be interpreted as what he calls “civilization”.\(^{11}\) Therefore, the collective identity of the US as a member of the West and its solidarity with other Western states is similar to the US as the core state of the Western civilization.

Wendt (1999) argues that collectivist states have the desire to help those they identify with even when their own security is not directly threatened. This reason could have lead Taiwan to change its type identity and because of this, it will be further explored in the third chapter of this work. For now, the main purpose of this work in this part of the section lie in developing Wendt’s understanding of interests. Interests, as Wendt claims, refer to what actors want. With respect to it, they designate motivations that help explain behavior and they presuppose identities. In accordance with him, an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is, and since identities have varying degrees of cultural content so will interests.

Ideas, as well as the distribution of knowledge, helps a state to constitute its identity and its identity is directly related to its interests. Nevertheless, Wendt (1999) states that identities by themselves do not explain an action since being is not the same thing as wanting. Thus the idea of interests is narrower than identities like identities select only a small part of

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\(^{10}\) Wendt (1999) states that the fact that the international system is poorly institutionalized does raise questions about the applicability of the concept of role identity for systemic IR.

\(^{11}\) This comparison is being made just for didactic reasons. At least two differences should be highlighted when comparing Huntington's concept of civilizations with Wendt’s collective identity. First, for Huntington (1996) civilizations are cultural entities, not political ones. Whereas for Wendt (1999), the political outcomes that states do seek when they identifies themselves with others states are less blurred. Second, collective identities duration depend on others identities, their configuration that make identification possible. On the other hand, Huntington’s civilizations have longue durée.
the ontology that serves as a ground to IR. According to Wendt, the social theory literature distinguishes two kinds of interests, objective and subjective. Objective interests are those related to the reproduction of an identity, without their fulfillment the identity can cease to exist. By contrast, the concept of subjective interests refers to those beliefs that actors actually have about how to meet their identity needs, and it is these that are the proximate motivation for behavior.

Wendt (1999) argues that subjective interests are about motivation, not behavior. Given this, this work will give more attention to objective interests than subjective ones. In what concerns objective interests, Wendt (1999) states that four kinds of identity have reproduction requirements. In this respect, he gives examples about the US alleging that it cannot be a state without its monopoly on organized violence (corporate identity); nor a capitalist state without enforcing private property rights (type identity), nor a hegemon without its clients (role identity); finally, it cannot be a member of the West without its solidarity with other Western states (collective identity).

Concerning states in general, which includes Taiwan, Wendt (1999) identifies four interests that they all share. The first concerns physical survival. The second, autonomy. According to him, autonomy refers to the ability of a state-society complex to exercise control over its allocation of resources and choice of government, which is closely linked with sovereignty. The third one is economic well-being, which refers to the maintenance of the mode of production in a society and, by extension, the state's resource base. Finally, the fourth interest is collective self-esteem, which regards a group's need to feel good about itself, for respect or status. The third chapter of this work will address to which extent the relationship between democracy and Confucianism was linked with these interests from 1991 to 2001.

1.2.3 Cultures of Anarchy

Wendt (1999) contends that the attributes of actors alone cannot explain outcomes in international politics. It must be complemented with an analysis on how actors interact between them and within a given structure. In this way, when dealing with states, the main structure that they are embedded in is the international system, and the international system has the quality of being anarchical. This structure is not only anarchical in the neorealist sense, that is, a structure composed by states and that lacks a higher power to rule them, but it is also cultural in the sense that anarchy is what states make of it.
Thus, Wendt (1999) acknowledges three kinds of structures, namely, Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian and, as he points out, the labels are intended merely as metaphors or stylized representations. These cultures construct states, and they do so by three ways that are related to the observance of cultural norms, that is, patrons of behavior, by states. First, states observe norms - and therefore are constructed by the structure - because they are forced to. The second reason is that states observe norms in order to satisfy their self-interest. Finally, they do so because they perceive the norms as legitimate.

The first culture pointed out by Wendt (1999), the Hobbesian one, has as its premise an environment of enmity. Within this culture, states who think in themselves as enemies creates representations of the Other as an state that “(1) does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore (2) will not willingly limit its violence toward the Self” (WENDT, 1999, p. 260). The images of enmity have a long tradition and some actors continue to position each other in such terms today. In ancient times, for instance, the Greeks represented the Persians as “barbarians”, the Crusaders perceived the Turks as “infidels” and so on.

Those representations, to Wendt (1999), are all based on representations of the Other as intent on destroying or enslaving the Self, and, by taking Taiwan into consideration, it is often called a rebel province, which follows a similar logic. Furthermore, China does not recognize the right of Taiwan to exist as an autonomous being and therefore will not willingly limit its violence toward it, then, it is possible to argue that the structure that characterizes the relation between China and Taiwan is Hobbesian. This representation of enmity could be reflected in the foreign policy of both countries as a particular logic of interaction. In this regard, Wendt indicates four ways in which the logic of the Hobbesian culture can manifest.

The first one is that states are likely to try to destroy or conquer those states that they perceive as enemies. Second, the decision-makers will have the tendency to consider and orient their policies toward the worst-case scenario, which increases the likelihood of conflict and decreases the likelihood of cooperation. Third, due to the fact the negative intentions toward one another are “known”, states will see relative military capabilities as essential. Finally, in case of actual war, states are not likely to observe limits on their own violence, unless it is clear that self-limitation is safe. That is because it creates a competitive disadvantage, in other words, states will fight on the enemy's terms. (WENDT, 1999)

The second culture of anarchy has as its core an environment of rivalry. Wendt (1999) affirms that similarly to enemies, although less threatening, rivals are also constituted by representations about Self and Other with respect to violence. By differentiating them, he
affirms that rivals do not try to conquer or dominate each other since they recognize each other’s sovereignty. But rivals are not like friends in what concerns respect to another state sovereignty, violence in disputes may still occur. Like the logic of Hobbesian anarchy, the Lockean anarchy can be summarized in four points.

The first is that regarding warfare, it can be simultaneously accepted and constrained. From time to time, states the right to use violence in order to promote their interests. Wars in this environment of rivalry could be just as common as in the Hobbesian anarchy, and they are accepted as normal and legitimate. The difference, however, is that wars in this anarchy do not intend to kill states, though arguably many people die. The second tendency for states embedded in this logic is that since warfare is limited, the system has a relatively stable membership or low death rate over time. A third point is that states tend to balance power, which is related to the mutual recognition of sovereignty. Finally, a final tendency is that neutrality or non-alignment becomes a recognized status.

According to Wendt (1999), the Lockean anarchy resembles Waltz’s neorealism, especially the self-help policy. This is possible because of the recognition of empirical sovereignty, which seems to presuppose at least tacit recognition of juridical sovereignty rather than the opposite. Type identities have an important role in Lockean culture. Therefore, it is not “enough merely to have the corporate identity of a state; within that category, it has always been necessary also to conform to type identity criteria which define only certain forms of state as legitimate (WENDT, 1999, p. 292). To Wendt, democracy and capitalism are progressively becoming dominant ways of constituting a state.

The last culture of anarchy is the Kantian one, which creates an environment of friendship. This atmosphere of friendship does not seem to apply to the case of Taiwan studied here, and, given that, this culture will not be further explored in this research. At the end of this section, it can be argued that Taiwan face a predominantly Hobbesian culture with China and a Lockean one with the United States. The support of this argument will be further explored in chapters two and three. In this respect, the next chapter will address the relation between democracy - a type identity that facilitates sovereignty for a state given the current configuration of international politics - and Confucianism - a set of beliefs that discourages democracy.
CHAPTER 2: CONFUCIANISM AND THE STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS THAT IT PRESENTS TO DEMOCRACY

The research question of this work - why did Taiwan turn into a democratic regime despite the cultural obstacles for implementing it in a Confucian civilization? - is based on the premise that Confucianism presents problems to democratization. Indeed, there is a vast literature that supports what is called here “the incompatibility argument”. In the Western literature, Huntington's works (1991; 1996) on this subject are perhaps the most famous and criticized. Thus, this study will explore his ideas in order to verify to what extent the incompatibility argument is valid for interpreting the relationship between Confucianism and democracy and under which circumstances such cultural obstacles can be softened.

This chapter, for achieving its goals, was divided into three sections. The first one will discuss democracy regarding two specific issues, respectively, its definition, and then, some requirements for democratization. After that, the second section will present three common interpretations of Confucianism. The first interpretation concerns the compatibility argument. The second interpretation claims, instead, that Confucianism and democracy are incompatible. The third interpretation of Confucianism allows a sort of convergence between Confucianism and democracy. Finally, the third section will address, as highlighted in the chapter's title, what is called in this work as structural problems12.

2.1 A BRIEF DISCUSSION ON DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION

Diamond (2001) argues that since Taiwan holds regular, free and fair elections, it can be seen as a democracy. In fact, for him, according to global standards, in 2001 Taiwan could be recognized not only as a democracy but also as a relatively liberal democracy. Besides, a study carried out by Yunhan Zhu, Larry Jay Diamond and To-ch’ŏl Sin in 2001 shows that Taiwan and South Korea are two genuine success stories of the third wave. In spite of this, to Zhu et al (2001), people in both countries still view authoritarianism as a political alternative to democracy, especially when they face problems regarding corruption and economic development. Although the consolidation of democracy in these countries is far from being

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12 According to Wendt (1999), the social structure is made primarily of ideas. In this regard, this work understands “structural problems” as a set ideas, beliefs and patrons of behaviors of Confucianism that, in Taiwan’s case, may pose problems to democratization.
perfect, for the authors, democracy is not in imminent danger in either country because they maintained a vigorous constitutional democracy since their transition.

To argue that Taiwan is a democracy, however, explains little of what democracy is about. The term democracy can have different meanings. In this matter, Hobsbawm (2013) observes that democracy has become an important word in the political field and, consequently, many countries, even the despotic ones, claim to be ruled by a democratic regime. Moreover, democracy contains many terms that make political communication difficult. For instance, Bovero (2002) states that democracy has its own grammar. For him, democracy has substantives such as liberty, equality, and citizenship; adjectives such as formal, substantial, direct, indirect, presidential and parliamentary; and verbs like to elect, to represent, and to decide.

Thus, defining democracy seems to be a complicated task, even though, in order to avoid the risk of conceptual stretching, it is an endeavor that researchers, sooner or later, shall take into consideration to avoid misperceptions and, accordingly, biased inferences. To accomplish such a task, studies dealing with democracy usually recur to Dahl’s definition for being one of the most referenced. Dahl (2005) states that equality among individuals is essential to democracy because it allows an open confirmation for power and inclusive political participation. In this regard, having public contestation and inclusiveness as starting points, democracy still requires eight conditions to exist - the so-called minimum procedural. They are: 1) freedom to form and join organizations; 2) freedom of expression; 3) right to vote; 4) eligibility for public office; 5) right of political leaders to compete for support and votes; 6) alternative sources of information; 7) free and fair elections; and finally, 8) institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.

Nevertheless, this research will not follow Dahl’s tradition, instead, it is going to use Huntington’s approach. The main reason for that is due to Huntington’s affirmation (1991; 1996) that Confucian democracy is a contradiction in terms. A similar position lies in the research question of this work and, then, caution with methodology advises such a decision.

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13 Democracy for Dahl is a utopian idea. It is more accurate to address his understandings on “democracy” as realistic democracy or polyarchy. This work will not use the term “polyarchy” because it will not be guided by Dahl’s definition.

14 To maintain scientific replicability criteria since this study choose to test a Huntington's premise, we will consider as our start point the very same conceptual basis adopted by the author to produce such a premise.

15 In fact, even Huntington (1984) considers that Dahl’s definition is not very useful for comparative empirical analysis. For him, Dahl’s definition of democracy implies that democratic political system is completely or almost completely responsible to all its citizens. Thus, as he points out, although such definition may be relevant to normative political theory, it has little applicability in comparative studies.
Huntington (1991), when defining democracy, holds that modern democracy has two criteria. First, the extension of the right to vote to at least 50% of male population. Second, a government chose by periodical elections. Huntington uses this definition to measure what he calls the democratic waves. The first country to fit this definition was the United States in 1826, which initiated the first wave. Taiwan is within the third democratic wave (ZHOU et al, 2001)

However, this definition alone is not enough for this work’s purpose. Huntington’s understanding of democratic values is, then, auxiliary to this definition. According to Huntington (1991), Confucianism emphasizes the group over the individual, authority over liberty, and responsibilities over rights and these values obstruct the path to democracy. Individuality, liberty, and rule of law are just a few examples of democratic values that matter for democratization and its maintenance. As a matter of fact, Huntington (1996, p.238) argues that Confucian heritage, “with its emphasis on authority, order, hierarchy, and the supremacy of the collectivity over the individual, creates obstacles to democratization.”. In short, Huntington sees Confucianism as either undemocratic or antidemocratic, in a way that it clashes with democratic values.

Since the discussion on democracy and democratic values have been made, this section can move to another topic: democratization and the resulting driving question, namely, what causes democracy? Many scholars attempted to answer this question, which paves the way for different answers. Przeworski et al (2003), for instance, argue that institutional and economic factor alone offer a reasonable explanation for democratization. They claim that cultural issues such as cultural patterns or a “democratic culture” cannot cause or sustain democracy. For them, democracy grows when it benefits relevant political actors. In this way, they state that in richer societies, the costs of conquering or maintaining power through authoritarianism are high and the benefits are low. By contrast, in poorer societies, the costs of authoritarianism are low, but the benefits are high. Thus, in this view, the economic development of a country plays a key role in democratization.

Notwithstanding, to restrict democratization to only these two variables - economy and institutions - can be misleading. Especially because, though important16, there is no linear correlation between socio-economic development and political development (NEUBAUER, 1967). In contrast, the studies on democratization presented by Huntington (1984) satisfies the

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16 Scholars such as Huntington (1984; 1991) and Fukuyama (1995) believe that economic development is very important to democratization. Nevertheless, economy development alone cannot cause democracy. As Huntington (1991, p. 33) asserts “economic development makes democracy possible; political leadership makes it real.”. In this sense, there are other variables that helps in explaining democratization.
purposes of this work. As he points out, there are four preconditions to democratization, namely, 1) wealth and equality; 2) social structure; 3) external environment, and 4) cultural context. According to him, the correlation between wealth and democracy is fairly strong and, when it comes to social structure, pluralism is highly desirable.

Although this research does recognize the importance of economic development (wealth and equality) and social structure, it will focus on the other two variables: external environment and cultural context. In fact, as will be argued in chapter 3, Taiwan was influenced by external factors to move toward a democracy - a type identity according to Wendt (1999) - in order to defend its personal identity. In this scenario, even cultural obstacles such as those presented by Confucianism was not strong enough to oppose democratization. These cultural obstacles are being designated here as structural problems.

In Taiwan’s case, structural problems were challenging to democratization. As Huntington (1984, p. 208) puts it: “Confucianism and Buddhism have been conducive to authoritarian rule, even in those cases where, as in Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, economic preconditions for democracy have come into being.”. Then, in spite of its economic development, Taiwan did not achieve the status of democracy in the early 1980s because of its structural problems. As a result, the fact that Taiwan turned into a democratic regime implies that its lack of democratic values embedded in its political culture\textsuperscript{17} was overcome with the help of others forces; to this research, these forces are the external factors.

As already argued, Taiwan is a third-wave democracy (ZHU et al, 2001). In this regard, this work needs to explain what factors led to the third-wave transitions in order to check Taiwan’s democratization. Huntington (1991) points out five factors that contributed to the occurrence of this wave. The first factor is related to the lack of legitimacy of authoritarian regimes due to its bad performance in the economic field. This factor does not seem to apply to Taiwan’s case. Before being democratic, Taiwan had a sound economy (HUNTINGTON, 1984). In fact, if this study were to explore Taiwan’s economic performance under democratic and authoritarian regimes, it would possibly come to the opposite conclusion. As Zhu et al (2001) states, low economic growth in Taiwan early 2000s lead many Taiwanese to disillusionment with democracy.

The second factor has to do with the economic growth that took place in most parts of the world in the 1960s. This global growth leads many countries to raise its living standards,

\textsuperscript{17} Huntington (1984) understands political culture a set beliefs and values, often religiously based, concerning the nature of humanity and society, the relations among human beings, and the relation of individuals to a transcendent being. To him, significant differences in the receptivity to democracy appear to exist among societies with different cultural traditions.
improve education, and to expand the urban middle class. This second factor will be further explored in chapter 3. The third factor concerns “a striking shift in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic Church, manifested in the Second Vatican Council of 1963-65 and the transformation of national Catholic churches from defenders of the status quo to opponents of authoritarianism.” (HUNTINGTON, 1991, p. 13). Although Huntington (1996) argues that Christian leaders promoted movement toward democracy in Taiwan, by virtue of the delimitation of this research, it will not work on this variable.

The fourth factor presented by Huntington (1991) is related to changes in the policies of external actors such as the European Community, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The third chapter of this work will explore some of these policies regarding the United States and China and their influence in Taiwan’s democratization. Finally, the fifth factor is about the demonstration effect of transitions earlier in the third wave in stimulating and providing models for subsequent efforts at democratization, or “snowballing” (HUNTINGTON, 1991). Since this brief discussion on democracy has been made, the next section will deal with structural problems to democratization posed by Confucianism.

2.2 CONFUCIANISM AND DEMOCRACY: THE COMPATIBILITY, INCOMPATIBILITY AND CONVERGENCE ARGUMENTS

As argued in the first chapter, the label “Confucian civilization” is a map. This map portrays and simplifies reality. When dealing with maps as tools for understanding reality, many data are not taken into account. For instance, when it comes to Taiwan, this map of Confucianism is not seeking to verify the level of commitment that Taiwanese have to Confucianist values, although this research addresses some literature that works directly with it. Besides, in Taiwan, there is a great religious diversity. Just to mention some, Buddhism, Taoism and Christianity have an important influence on Taiwanese contemporary identity. Atheism and agnosticism are also widespread among Taiwanese. Philosophers such as Tao Te Ching and Sun Tzu are discussed all over Asia and, consequently, help to shape Taiwanese mindset (LIU, 2014).

However, despite its limitations, Confucianism is an appropriate map for interpreting some features of Taiwanese society. These features include structural problems to democratization. To two of three interpretations of Confucianism that this study will present, Confucian values pose obstacles to the implementation of democracy. These interpretations are, respectively, the “incompatibility argument” and the “convergence argument”.

Concerning the third interpretation, the “compatibility argument”, it claims that democracy can prevail in Confucian civilizations. The next topic of this section will bring authors who support this compatibility argument.

2.2.1 The Compatibility argument

The literature that supports the compatibility argument usually stresses points such as accountability, societal participation, and equality, which are ideas that permeate both democracy and Confucianism (SHIN, 2012). Concerning accountability, Shin (2012) argues that Confucianism values societal order and civilian loyalty to the state and, precisely because of it, ruler’s accountability to the people is important. According to him, in the Confucian tradition, the rulers must take care of people’s welfare, and they only are perceived as legitimate and they do so. People, in its turn, accept or consent to ruler’s decision is the basis of this very legitimacy.

This kind of accountability, however, does not meet the definition of democracy nor democratic values used in this work. Shin (2012) himself claims that these principles are not fully related to the definition of democracy as government by the people, instead, these ideas that guide ruler’s and people’s actions meet the definition of democracy as a government for the people. In Shin’s view, for those who argue for the compatibility thesis, the government for the people still is a democracy. In this regard, in order to sustain their argument, they make a comparison between the Confucian practice of selecting government officials by public and open examinations and the free and competitive elections of political leaders that takes place in the West.

The second point of proximity between Confucianism and democracy is societal participation. As Shin (2012) argues, societal participation is central to democratic societies. For him, Western liberalism lies in the idea of the people choosing leaders and shaping policies through free and fair elections. Similarly, Confucian values can promote civil societies, although widespread participation might not seem as emblematic of Confucianism. To Confucianism, it is state’s responsibility to promote public participation through the provision of equal education, this belief, according to Shin’s interpretation, is a way to promote societal mobilization through instruction. In this sense, once people have education they will be able to place demands on state leaders.

Finally, equality is commonly cited as a point of compatibility between Confucianism and democracy. As Shin (2012) argues, Confucians believe that equality of individuals is
given by nature. One consequence of this attitude in the political field is the effort to promote universal education for all citizens, regardless their background. According to Shin, like Confucianism, democracy has to develop an informed citizenry through education in order to maintain the principle of democratic citizenship. The main difference between both is perhaps that Confucianism supports the idea that not all citizens possess the abilities needed to become political leaders, although everyone has the opportunity to take merit-based civil service examinations, and, as a result, to be appointed as a government official.

Another scholar who highlights this point of equality concerning the compatibility between Confucianism and democracy is Fukuyama (1995). For him, “the traditional Confucian examination system was a meritocratic institution with potentially egalitarian implications” (FUKUYAMA, 1995, p. 25). That traditional system of examinations of Confucian civilizations was not really open to all qualified individuals, nevertheless, as Fukuyama points out, in their modern form, the examination systems are significant means to upward mobility, which contributes to a more egalitarian income distribution. To Fukuyama, this issue of income distribution is important to democratization since he sees a strong correlation between development and democracy\(^\text{18}\).

In addition to accountability, societal participation and equality, Fukuyama (1995) consider to others points of compatibility between Confucianism and democracy, education and tolerance. Fukuyama holds that education is not a formal requirement of democracy. However, he claims that people cannot know about and therefore participate in the democratic debate if they have not a high level of literacy. Besides, in this view, education can lead Confucianist civilization toward democracy because it tends to make people wealthier and more concerned with noneconomic issues such as recognition and political participation.

Fukuyama (1995) states that Confucianism is relatively tolerant. For him, when compared to Islam and Christianity, for example, it is arguably more pacific. This level of tolerance is important to democracy. Indeed, Fukuyama (1995, p. 21) concludes that “there are fewer points of incompatibility between Confucianism and democracy than many people in both Asia and the West believe”. In fact, sustaining the compatibility argument seems plausible since three Confucians societies, Japan\(^\text{19}\), South Korea and Taiwan were democracies in the final of the period analyzed in this work - from 1991 to 2001.

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\(^{18}\) According to Fukuyama (1995), the modernization theory was confirmed, at least for Asia. In this perspective economic development tends to be followed by political liberalization. For him, this correlation, however, is more related to education than to wealth itself.

\(^{19}\) Huntington (1996) recognizes Japan as a distinct civilization that was the offspring of Confucian civilization. Shin (2012) and to Fukuyama (1995), when addressing democracy and democratization, holds that Japanese
2.2.2 The Incompatibility Argument

Dahl (1989) claims that there are two possible critics of democracy, the anarchists and the supporters of a system of guardianship. For him, the latter is democracy’s most threatening competitor. To advocates of a guardianship system, only a specially qualified elite is able to govern, which means a government for the people, and not by the people. According to Dahl, Plato’s ideas concerning politics are the main source of guardianship critics toward democracy in the West. However, to him, Confucius is the one who has more deep and practical ideas on this matter. In this perspective, Confucianism is a guardianship system and, therefore, it should be regarded as opposed to democracy.

Actually, democratic and social movements in Taiwan perceive Confucianism as a source of authoritarianism, and thus irreconcilable with their principles (FETZER and SOPER, 2010). In this sense, a study carried out by Fetzer, Soper (2010) presents interviews conducted in Taiwan, and it shows that defenders of aboriginal rights, press freedom, women’s rights strongly oppose Confucianist values in Taiwanese society. To them, values such as social harmony, filial piety, and a stress on a communal ethos are often used to legitimate authoritarian regimes. As a result, social progress and democracy are difficult to obtain in such a cultural environment.

In relation to the incompatibility between Confucianism and democracy, perhaps the most well-known scholar in the West who advocates for it is Huntington. Huntington (1991) argues that certain non-Western cultures are hostile to democracy. Among them are Islam and Confucianism. According to him, Confucianism is either undemocratic or antidemocratic. Against this view, the only mitigating factor could be the examination system considering that it really open opportunities to the talented without regard to social background. Nonetheless, Huntington points out that even if this were the case, a system of promotion based on merit does not make a democracy.

Moreover, Huntington (1991) holds that to Confucian civilization harmony and cooperation are much more desirable than disagreement and competition. Harmony and cooperation are better achieved in an environment of order and respect for hierarchy. These ideas directly confront the democratic values of conflict of ideas, groups, and parties, values that Confucianism sees as illegitimate. In fact, “a primary criterion for democracy is equitable and open competition for votes between political parties without government harassment or obstacles to democratization are similar to others countries of the Confucian civilization since both share certain Asian values such as social hierarchy, collectivism and social harmony.
reduction of opposition groups.” (HUNTINGTON, 1991, p. 26). To Huntington, equitable and open elections are something that Confucianism cannot offer.

Still in this matter, according to Kissinger (2011), Confucianism teaches a social hierarchy in which the most fundamental duty is to “know thy place”. In this way, the place of the Chinese Emperor was not only the one of a political ruler but also of a metaphysical concept, the “Son of Heaven”. To Kissinger, such a devotion to political leaders is still common in the Confucian tradition. This scenario of social hierarchy is linked with Chinese exceptionalism. Kissinger holds that whereas American exceptionalism is ideological, Chinese exceptionalism is cultural.

In fact, when it comes to culture, many Confucian societies and other Asians believe to have a more developed culture than the one of the West, which can be objectively observed through economic performance. As Huntington (1996, p. 107) puts it: “Asians believe this economic success is largely a product of Asian culture, which is superior to that of the West, which is culturally and socially decadent.”. This Chinese cultural exceptionalism is also related to collectivism over individualism, or, as Spina (2011) calls it, the group primacy. According to him, East Asia’s traditional family systems enhance personal relationships, which contributes to trust, an important economic variable. In addition, to Spina, this group primacy may be impeding the growth of formal democracy.

To finish this section, it is important to present three limits of cultural obstacles pointed out by Huntington. The first one is that arguments that particular cultures are permanent obstacles to change should be viewed with a certain skepticism. For instance, the Weberian tradition claimed that Catholic countries were unlikely to develop economically in the same manner as Protestant countries. The same mistake may be occurring to Confucianism and democratization. Second, Confucianism is a complex set of ideas, beliefs, doctrines, assumptions, and behavior patterns. In this regard, it does has elements compatible with democracy just as Protestantism has undemocratic elements. Third, cultures historically are dynamic, not stagnant, so they are subject to change (HUNTINGTON, 1991).

20 Heaven (Tian), according to traditional Chinese political theory, is the source of all legitimate authority on earth. Heaven, therefore, chooses the most worthy person or family and gives the Mandate of Heaven to them. This person or family, as a result, rules over All Under Heaven (Tianxia). This rule has to be for the benefit of all inhabitants. A legitimate authority is, by definition, universal.” (HARARI, 2015).
21 In this matter, a research of Chung (2013) shows that similar to Latin America, Confucian countries like South Korea values a sort of father figure like the president. Consequently, these countries tend to choose a system of delegative democracy in which the president isolates himself from most political institutions and organized interests. Such a system could be regarded as an “illiberal democracy” or “soft authoritarianism.”
2.2.3 - The convergence argument

The arguments supporting or opposing the compatibility between Confucianism and democracy may vary geographically. Fröhlich (2017), for instance, advocates that thinkers in mainland China usually come to the conclusion that Confucianism and democracy are incompatible. Conversely, scholars in Taiwan and in the United States generally claim that the two are compatible. Author’s interpretation concerning this relationship can vary not only geographically but also in degrees. Therefore, the convergence argument attempts to verify the extent to which democracy and Confucianism can coexist.

In this matter, even Huntington contends that democracy can endure in a Confucian society. In his words: “Confucian democracy may be a contradiction in terms, but democracy in a Confucian society need not be.” (HUNTINGTON, 1991, p.30). According to him, the central question is to determine “which elements in Islam and Confucianism are favorable to democracy, and how and under what circumstances these can supersede the undemocratic aspects of those cultural traditions.” (HUNTINGTON, 1991, p. 30). Thus, the more democratic elements authors see in Confucianism, the more convergent they argue that Confucianism and democracy are.

In such a context, Confucianism can converge with democracy in many ways. For instance, Chung’s research hypothesis (2013) is that Confucian values clash with democracy in social relations both in the definition and historically, notwithstanding, democracy can prevail in state sphere. In this way, he argues that Confucianism highlights hierarchy in social relations, which conflicts with the non-hierarchical relations of democracy in social relations. However, even constraining democracy in social relations, Confucianism does not necessarily thwart popular support for political democracy, which involves formal conditions of the institutionalized political process.

Another manner to argue for the convergence of democracy and Confucianism is to advocate for a Confucian(ized) democracy or a democracy with Chinese characteristics. In this sense, Fröhlich (2017) observes that thinkers like Jiang Qing strongly emphasizes the superiority of a Confucian(ized) democracy over Western liberal democracies. This supposed superiority would come from meritocratic rules for the promotion and demotion of government officials that is common in Confucianist societies like China. In fact, Fröhlich defends that this kind of regime is in dialogue with J.S. Mill’s political views, to whom an independent political body represented by elites is desirable because they are able to make wiser judgments in detriment to the mass of less-educated citizens.
Keping (2009), an advocator of democracy in China, the core state of the Confucian civilization, argues that democracy is a good thing. In his view, democracy is a universal value and eventually all countries will be ruled by a democratic regime. However, the realization of democracy demands certain economic, political, and cultural conditions and these conditions vary across countries and time. As a consequence, democracy in different countries generally contains unique and respective features. For him, due to its unique features, the type of democracy that would work for Confucian societies like China is a deliberative democracy.

This deliberative democracy is not the root that Taiwan followed in its own democratization (CHENG, 2010). In fact, Cheng (2010) claims that Taiwan’s democracy can serve as an example to democratization in China. In this matter, to Cheng, even arguing for a convergence of democracy and Confucianism, Keping does not share democratic values for complete. As Cheng critiques Keping’s political assertions, “democracy is a good thing but...”. In this perspective, Keping defends democracy in China to the extent that is not too costly to elites’ interests; or it does not destabilize China’s position in Asia; or to the extent that it adapt to national conditions. Thus, even deliberative democracy face many problems to be implemented, in spite of showing a certain level of convergence of Confucianism and democracy.

This notion of democracy with Chinese characteristics was also elaborated by Bell (1999), who contends that democracy can prevail in a Confucian society. According to him, a democratic system must fulfill at least three requirements. First, it must have regular elections based on universal franchise. Second, it must give ordinary citizens a say, no matter how distant in political decision-making they might be. Finally, a democratic system must promote political accountability. Bell states that China fit these requirements without imitating Western liberal democracy. As a matter of fact, in line with Confucian tradition, he claims that a classic model of representative democracy does not work in China because ordinary citizens still are uneducated and, as a result, they cannot make wise judgments on long-run policies.

In Bell’s view (1999), the model of democracy that could work for Confucianist societies is the one in which exists a bicameral legislature. In this model, the lower house would be democratically elected and the upper house - the “House of Scholars” - would be composed of representatives selected on the basis of competitive examinations. In such a system, in case of conflicts of interests concerning the lower and upper houses, the last say would be given to the lower house, since in democracy unelected leaders cannot hold the
power to make final decisions. Needless to say that Taiwan is not ruled by such regime, so it must have overcome its structural problems by using another approach. Before discussing this approach, this work has to present some considerations on structural problems.

2.3 SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS

As argued in chapter one, according to Wendt (1999), the ontology of social structures is idealist, which means that it is made primarily by ideas. In this regard, this work assumes that the ideas that permeate the Confucian civilization present obstacles, problems to democratization - so that explains why this research uses the term “structural problems”. To some scholar, Confucianism is a hostile environment to democracy (HUNTINGTON, 1991; 1996). Actually, even scholars who state that democracy and Confucianism are two compatible ideas, like Shin (2012) or Fukuyama (1995), argue that they are not perfectly compatible. In this sense, accountability, societal participation, equality, education, and tolerance are all Confucianist beliefs that do not entirely meet the definition of democracy, nor democratic values, in the way that they are exercised in Confucian civilization.

Confucianism is a system of guardianship, where only the best-qualified guardians are able to govern (DAHL, 1989). This guardianship model has influenced the economic performance of countries of the Confucian civilization such as China, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan (YU, 2000). In addition, like Huntington (1996) argues, China is the core state of the Confucian civilization and thus it has the power to attract those countries that are culturally alike. In this context, not only democratization is difficult to achieve, but also, once democratized, a state may not resist Chinese influence. This argument is related to Chinese cultural exceptionalism advocated by Kissinger (2011).

Chinese cultural exceptionalism could play against democracy in Taiwan. In this way, the performance of China’s system is another feature of the structural problems linked with the democratization in Taiwan. In fact, according to Zhu et al (2001), corruption and low economic growth in Taiwan in the early 2000s lead many Taiwanese to disillusionment with democracy, and thus willing had its political model of guardianship back. Chinese cultural exceptionalism, however, must be relativized. As Huntington (1996) states, in the early twentieth century, Chinese intellectuals claimed that Confucianism was the source of Chinese backwardness. Conversely, in the late twentieth century, Chinese political leaders guaranteed that Confucianism was the source of Chinese progress. Therefore, it seems difficult to predict what political outcomes are likely to come from Confucianism.
The central question is, therefore, to understand what are the limits of these structural problems. Huntington (1984) points out four points that facilitate democracy, namely, wealth and equality; social structure; external environment; and cultural context. Domestic culture matters, nevertheless, there are at least three limits to what is regarded as cultural obstacles. First, cultures’ relation to the political system can be misinterpreted; second, they are complex bodies with a number of elements that can favor any political regime; third, cultures change, they are not static. Cultural context, like economic development, cannot cause or impede democracy alone. However, how to explain why Taiwan was willing to overcome these structural problems in the first place? Why was Taiwan not attracted to China, the core of Confucian civilization? The next chapter will attempt to shed light on these questions.
CHAPTER 3 – THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL FACTORS IN TAIWAN’S MOVE TOWARD DEMOCRATIZATION

In its first chapter, by adopting a constructivist perspective, this research showed that the ontology of International Relations as a science is made primarily by ideas. Social phenomena, unlike natural kinds, depend on ideas in order to exist. In this sense, ideas give meaning to material conditions (WENDT, 1999). Subsequently, this study presented the concept of civilization developed by Huntington (1996). According to him, as explored in chapter 2, Confucian civilization has shared beliefs that oppose both democracy and democratic values. This work, after offering three common interpretations of the relationship between Confucianism and democracy, namely, the compatibility, incompatibility, and incompatibility arguments, came to the conclusion that Confucianism, in fact, does pose some problems to the establishment of liberal democracy. Then, this research labeled this idealist antagonism as structural problems.

However, when dealing with democratization, domestic culture, though important, is not the only element that matters. Huntington (1984) claims that are four variables that scholars need to take into consideration to fully understand democratization, and they are: 1) wealth and equality; 2) social structure; 3) external environment, and 4) cultural context. Naturally, the explanatory power of each one of these variables varies from case to case. Thus, a set of ideas concerning the external environment and economic development, for instance, could additionally provide sufficient analytical elements to explain democracy in Taiwan to the detriment of structural problems related to Confucian civilization in not explaining it at all. In this way, this chapter will focus on the external factors and will do so by using a Wendtian framework as theoretical road map.

As seen, to Wendt (1999), structure affects agents in a constitutive way and due to this agent-structure relation, the structure may have causal effects on agents. Therefore, the international system, which is embedded in a culture of anarchy, not only construct agents such as states but can also cause their behavior. Similarly, due to the fact that a constitutive relationship is always relational, states’ ideas about other states and about the system construct anarchy - anarchy is what states make of it. States have their own properties, and Wendt categorizes these properties as identities and interests. On the one hand, taken together these identities and interests are the ground for constructing the cultures of the international system, which can be Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian like. On the other hand, these cultures...
of anarchy can influence states’ properties, and this is the systemic or holistic feature of Wendt’s theory.

In this sense, this study attempts to explain how the cultures of anarchy changed Taiwan’s properties, that is, its identity and interests. Thus, the first section of this chapter will discuss Taiwan’s personal identity and interests. The second section will address the two cultures of the international system that matters the most when dealing with the process of democratization in Taiwan, that is, the Hobbesian and the Lockean cultures. These cultures, in a relational process with Taiwan, were associated with China and the United States, respectively. At the end of the second section, there is an analysis of how the Lockean and Hobbesian cultures worked during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-1996. The third and final section of this chapter will shed some light on the so-called Taiwan’s type identity and interests by taking into consideration the analytical framework presented in the previous chapters.

3.1 TAIWAN’S PERSONAL IDENTITY AND ITS INTERESTS

In chapter one, this work has argued that Taiwan’s personal identity is state-like. Consequently, it fulfills all the requirements highlighted by Wendt (1999) with respect to the features of a state, which are: to have an institutional-legal order; an organization claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence; an organization with sovereignty; a society; and territory. It was also argued that despite the controversies concerning Taiwan political status, it has a de facto independence (KUNTIĆ, 2015). This means that although Taiwan does not possess de jure sovereignty recognized by all states of the international system, it does exercise some level of sovereignty. In sum, Taiwan has autonomy and enjoys a de facto sovereignty, and it characterizes its personal identity as a state.

According to Wendt (1999), the personal or corporate identity is constituted by self-organizing and homeostatic structures that distinguish the Self from the Other. In this sense, belonging to the Confucian civilization, at the broadest level, is an important part of Taiwan’s identity. This feature of Taiwan’s identity, as analyzed in chapter two, establishes structural problems for the implementation of democracy. Another important feature of Taiwan’s identity is its history as a state. In this regard, after its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1874-95), as part of the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China was forced to cede Taiwan to Japan (KO, 2004). Ko (2004) argues that Japan invested heavily in Taiwan's infrastructure
and educational system and, as a result, this helped Taiwan to develop its economy during the second half of the twentieth century.

Taiwan returned to China at the end of World War II, however, in 1949 Chiang Kai-shek transferred the Nationalist party (Kuomintang-KMT) to Taiwan as a consequence of a civil war between nationalists and communists in China (KO, 2004). According to Tang (2011), due to its anti-communist stance during the Cold War, the U.S. regarded Taiwan as an important ally. Thanks to this alliance, as Tang argues, the U.S. government had only recognized the government of Taiwan as the sole legitimate government of all of China and had maintained diplomatic relations with it until 1979. However, Tang stress that in January 1979 the U.S. transferred diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, and it accorded with the one-China policy, which states that Taiwan is part of China.

In 1979 the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) that raises six main policy points and, among them, there is the statement that “the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.” (NAVARRO, 2016). The TRA recognizes Taiwan as an important (albeit unofficial) American defense partner in Asia, and it articulates a formal defense commitment to Taiwan (TKACIK, 2007). Navarro (2016) highlights that the TRA not only indirectly commits the United States to a defense of Taiwan if Beijing uses military force but it also recognizes “three warfare” tactics like the tourist boycotts and trade embargoes as weapons that constitute “other than peaceful means,” that may justify U.S. intervention.

To the U.S., this special partnership with Taiwan as its virtual ally is important for many reasons, and Tkacik (2007) raises the geostrategic, political and economic ones. In the geostrategic side, he contends that Taiwan occupies 13,000 square miles of the strategic real estate in what General Douglas MacArthur once called America’s “littoral defense line in the western Pacific”, which is a key tenet of America’s security strategy in the Western Pacific. In the economic and political sides, Taiwan had, in the period analyzed here, a bigger population than Australia, a larger Gross Domestic Product (GDP) than Indonesia, and an advanced technology base second only to Japan’s. Moreover, Taiwan was America’s eighth largest trading partner and sixth largest agricultural customer. As a defense and intelligence partner of the U.S., Taiwan helped the U.S. against the Sino–Soviet alliance.

These characteristics of Taiwan’s identity matters for the United States. Similarly, there are other features of Taiwan’s identity from the Chinese perspective. In this sense, Tang
(2011) points out that China regards Taiwan as a renegade province, which is ethnically Han\textsuperscript{22} and by the late 19th century was administered as a normal province. Therefore, in China’s view, by ethnic and linguistic criteria, Taiwan belongs to China. To Wendt (1999), identity helps to shape states’ interests, and interests refer to what actors want. In this respect, an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is, therefore, interests designate motivations that help explain behavior. Given the features of Taiwan’s personal identity studied here, this research can explore its interests.

As developed in chapter one, there are two kinds of interests, objective and subjective. Objective interests are related to the reproduction of an identity, without their fulfillment, the identity can cease to exist. The subjective interests, on the other hand, refers to beliefs that actors actually have about how to meet their identity needs. Thus, concerning states objectives interests, Wendt (1999) claims that all states share the following: physical survival, defense of its autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem. According to Zhu (2005), China represents a threat to all Taiwan’s objective interests.

Although the perception of threat to objectives interests lies in the field of subjective interests, as Wendt (1999) stresses, this perception is grounded in concrete basis. In this regard, “there is an enduring collective memory of how Taiwanese have suffered subordination and victimization by external forces [especially from Beijing], and along with this memory goes a widely shared desire for self-determination” (ZHU, 2005, p. 52). Therefore, the answer to the question of why did Taiwan want to become a democracy is linked to the defense of its objective interests. The change of its type identity from an authoritarian regime to a democracy, as will be argued in the last section of this chapter, is a subjective interest that aims to safeguard its physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem. The next section will further develop external factors that contributed to this change in Taiwan’s type identity.

3.2 CULTURES OF ANARCHY: CHINA AND UNITED STATES AS KEY PLAYERS IN TAIWAN’S DEMOCRATIZATION

According to Huntington (1984), the external environment has a great weight in explaining democratization. In fact, all aspects of the third wave of democracy have systemic

\textsuperscript{22} The Han Chinese is the largest ethnic group in China. They expanded from their original base in the Yellow River valley, gradually drawing neighboring societies into various stages of approximation of Chinese patterns – which is the so-called Chinese cultural exceptionalism (KISSINGER, 2011).
features like: (1) The lack of legitimacy of authoritarian regimes; (2) the unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s; (3) the striking shift in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic Church manifested in the Second Vatican Council of 1963-65; (4) the policies of external actors like the U.S., the European Community and the Soviet Union; and (5) the snowballing (HUNTINGTON, 1991). Some of these factors that caused the third wave of democracy are, to this work’s research design, antecedent variables, nonetheless, some of these systemic facilitators for democratization has little to do with Taiwan’s democratization.

For instance, Huntington (1996) states that Christian leaders promoted movement toward democracy in Taiwan, however, he acknowledges that this influence was very limited. In addition, this Christian influence on Taiwan’s democratization of the 1990s is almost uncorrelated with the changes for the Catholic Church manifested in the Second Vatican Council. Moreover, other limited systemic third wave explanation for democratization in Taiwan is the snowballing - the demonstration effect of transitions earlier in the third wave in stimulating and providing models for subsequent efforts at democratization. As Huntington (1991) points out, if a country lack favorable internal conditions to democracy, like the cultural context, for example, snowballing is unlikely to bring about democratization. Besides, it is just possible to argue in favor of a snowballing effect in Asia after Taiwan’s and South Korea’s democratization.

In this way, Huntington (1991) argue that Confucian or Confucian-influenced societies have been inhospitable to democracy. In his words “in East Asia only two countries, Japan, and the Philippines had sustained experience with the democratic government prior to 1990. In both cases, democracy was the product of an American presence.” (HUNTINGTON, 1991, p. 24). Given this context, snowballing in East Asia is quite restricted for understanding Taiwan’s democratization. However, there are other systemic explanations to Taiwan’s democratization that are not covered by Huntington’s theoretical framework. These systemic explanations are the cultures of anarchy in which Taiwan is within. The next two topics will develop, respectively, the Hobbesian and the Lockean cultures.

3.2.1 The Hobbesian Culture: the relationship between China and Taiwan

The relationship between China and Taiwan, according to Huntington's concept of civilization, should be smooth. As analyzed in Chapter one, Huntington (1996) contends that in the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are cultural, and not ideological, political, or economic. For him, people define themselves in terms of
ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. In addition, Huntington claims that people identify with cultural groups such as, at the broadest level, civilizations. In this sense, people use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity. Once people have defined their identity, they can pursue their interests, and people’s identity is related to the other. In his words “we know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.” (p. 21).

To Huntington (1996), after the Cold War culture took the shape of both a divisive or unifying force. Therefore, as he argues, people separated by ideology but united by culture come together, as the two Germanys did. This cultural affinity or dissimilarity has political outcomes. In this way, Huntington states that “countries tend to bandwagon with countries of similar culture and to balance against countries with which they lack cultural commonality” (p. 155). This “shared Chineseness” - to borrow a term from Huntington - between China and Taiwan can also contribute to the economic field due to the mutual trust. There is, therefore, an increasing boost in the economic relations between these two nations that can be perceived especially in tourism and trade.

According to Huntington (1996), in the late of 1993, there had been over 4.2 million visits of Taiwanese to the mainland and 40,000 visits of mainlanders to Taiwan. Furthermore, 40,000 letters and 13,000 phone calls were exchanged every day. Moreover, when it comes to trade, Huntington states that trade between China and Taiwan reached $14.4 billion in 1993. Investments coming from Taiwan to China was increasing each year during the 1990s. In 1993, for instance, 20,000 Taiwan businesses, in accordance with Huntington, had invested something between $15 billion and $30 billion in the mainland China.

Conversely, this “shared Chineseness” does not ameliorate the political and economic agendas any further. On the contrary, in the economic side, as Huntington (1996) alerts, Taiwan’s success is increasingly dependent on China, and not on the U.S., its former larger trading partner. The relation between the two Chinas in the political side is even worse. Huntington points out that in 1995, the relationship between China and Taiwan declined due to a push for diplomatic recognition and admission to international organizations performed by the Taiwanese government. The situation got worse with Taiwan’s attempt to become a democracy in 1995-1996.

After a visit to the United States in 1995, the former Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui demanded improvements in Taiwan’s democracy. Taiwanese government and society attended his demand. In December 1995 Taiwan held legislative elections. In March 1996, Taiwan held presidential elections - in accordance with the democratic principles studied in
the previous chapter - for the first time in its history. China’s response was rapid and tough, in this way, Chinese government tested missiles in waters close to the major Taiwanese ports. In addition, it engaged in military exercises near Taiwanese-controlled offshore islands (HUNTINGTON, 1996).

Given this context, Huntington (1996, p.173) raises two questions concerning Taiwan’s future as a democracy. Firstly, “for the present, can Taiwan remain democratic without becoming formally independent?” And, secondly, "in the future could Taiwan be democratic without remaining actually independent?”. These two questions link democracy and independence, as a direct causal relation. In fact, for Tang (2011), in the political narrative, democracy and independence go hand in hand. Tang, in his study on how the U.S newspaper The New York Times addresses the Taiwan issue, it realized that the rhetoric of Taiwan’s independence is intertwined with the rhetoric of democracy and freedom. In this sense, not only scholars but also media and the public opinion make a correlation between democracy and independence in Taiwan’s case.

As Huntington (1996) claims, Taiwan’s democratization and, eventually, the possibility of it bring independence to this country represents a risk to China’s territorial integrity. Moreover, Gupta (2005), when comparing China’s policies toward Taiwan and the South China Sea, contends that, in China’s perspective, Chinese dispute over Taiwan is legitimized by reference to moral principles of anti-colonialism and anti-hegemonism. In this sense, for China, “the reunification of Taiwan is the culmination of the process of anti-imperialist, anti-colonial struggle launched by the CCP in the last century” (GUPTA, 2005, p. 249).

Therefore, taking into consideration China’s view on Taiwan question, Huntington’s arguments on civilization could work. Indeed, ideological differences between China and Taiwan seem to matter less to China than their cultural proximity. Taiwan symbolizes to China an important component of its identity. Furthermore, its reunification with Taiwan could be regarded as the overcoming of its century of humiliation (KISSLINGER, 2011). However, reunification with Taiwan also means the achievement of concrete goals, like geostrategic or nationalist ones. And, in order to achieve such goals, China follows a pragmatic economic policy aiming at a deep economic integration with Taiwan, but it also pursues this task through the military front (GUPTA, 2005). Such an approach does not seem to fit Huntington's ideas on civilization, where cultural proximity leads to cooperation and harmony.
From the Chinese perspective, the threats, as well as the conflicts directed to Taiwan, could be explained by what Huntington (1996) calls as a torn country, a typology previously mentioned in chapter one. For him, torn countries are those willing to identify with another civilization, in Taiwan’s case, with Western civilization. In this regard, the more Taiwan gets cultural fragmented, the more it represents a threat to China, and this could explain the clashes between both. But for what reason is Taiwan getting closer to the Western civilization in the first place? This question the Huntingtonian theoretical framework cannot properly answer since, according to him, unlike empires that rise and fall or governments that come and go, civilizations remain, they are able to survive economic, political and even ideological upheavals.

In face of this scenario in which Huntington’s theory is insufficient to explain why Taiwan is moving toward the Western civilization or, in other words, why Taiwan became a democracy, this research needs to approach the cultures of anarchy. This work understands that the relationship between China and Taiwan during the period under analysis here - from 1991 to 2001 - was predominantly of a Hobbesian culture. As stressed in chapter one, a country within this culture does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being. As a consequence, it will not willingly limit its violence toward the Self (WENDT, 1999).

In this sense, in China’s interpretation of the “one China policy”, it rejects any interpretation that suggests anything less than Beijing’s complete sovereignty over Taiwan (TKACIK, 2007). Thus, China does not recognize Taiwan as an autonomous being. To Wendt (1999), in the logic of the Hobbesian culture, states are likely to try to destroy or conquer those states that they perceive as enemies, and they also tend to consider and orient their policies toward the worst-case scenario. This outcome suggests that war is always likely to happen. Such a conflict did not happen in the analyzed period, as will be argued in the next section, due to the special relationship between Taiwan and the U.S., that is to say, in Wendtian language, that China limited its violence toward Taiwan because it was constrained by other forces.

Nevertheless, peace between China and Taiwan is far from being a reality. Threats are constants, especially when Taiwan attempts to improve its democracy or seeks diplomatic recognition by countries or international organizations. In this sense, regarding a major event concerning threats coming from China to Taiwan during its democratization, this study pointed out the cross-strait crisis in 1995-96. According to Navarro (2016), one of the more delicate and dangerous time of Taiwan’s recent history was the cross-strait crisis of 1995-96.
In this regard, Taiwan saw live fire exercise by Beijing juxtaposed with American sea power protecting democracy in Taiwan. To Navarro, the defense of democracy in Taiwan is ambivalent, in this respect, Taiwan does not wish to provoke Beijing - because it represents a threat to its personal identity - and, at the same time, Taiwan has even less desire to bend to China’s authoritarian will. Due to its importance, the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996 and its Hobbesian and Lockean features will be further analyzed at the end of this section.

### 3.2.2 The Lockean Culture: the relationship between the United States and Taiwan

Wendt (1999) argues that the Lockean culture has as its core an environment of rivalry. In this sense, states are constituted by representations about Self and Other with respect to violence. Nevertheless, unlike Hobbesian anarchy, rivals do not try to conquer or dominate each other since they recognize each other’s sovereignty. In the logic of Lockean culture, warfare can be simultaneously accepted and constrained, although wars in this anarchy do not intend to kill states. Besides, this logic states in this system have a relatively stable membership or low death rate over time. States in this culture also tend to balance power, and neutrality or non-alignment becomes a recognized status. To Wendt, the Lockean anarchy resembles Waltz’s neorealism, especially the self-help policy.

Wendt (1999) argues that in Lockean culture, type identities have a key role. In this regard, the personal identity as a state may seem insufficient to exercise statehood in the sense that it may lack “legitimacy”. In this culture, legitimate states, therefore, need to conform to type identity criteria. To Wendt, democracy and capitalism are progressively becoming dominant forms of states’ type identities. However, against this global trend, the force of this democratic movement suffers ups and downs in Asia. For instance, as Tkacik (2007) argues, the stronger China gets the more states perceive authoritarianism as an alternative to America’s declining democracy.

In this line, Huntington (1996) argues that the growing skepticism about democracy in Asia is relational with culture, especially in Confucian civilization, which regards itself as superior to Western civilization. For him, Confucian countries perceive the U.S as a fading power beset by political stagnation, economic inefficiency, and social chaos, and they attribute these misfortunes to democracy. Conversely, Huntington claims that, in spite of these structural problems to democratization, the West has generated the belief that an ongoing global democratic revolution spreading human rights and Western forms of political
democracy should prevail after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Having this belief in mind, many Westerners promoted the policy of spreading democracy through the world.

To Huntington (1996) the U.S. was the most prominent of these Westerns promoters of democracy in the 1990s. In this view, for instance, the Bush administration endorsed that “‘beyond containment lies democracy’ and that for the post-Cold War world ‘President Bush has defined our new mission to be the promotion and consolidation of democracy.’” (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 193). Therefore, given this context of a widespread movement toward democracy as well as democracy being a core value to the U.S., Wendtian approach suggests that would be preferable to Taiwan to conform its type identity as a democracy due to its relationship with the United States.

In fact, according to Tkacik (2007), the belief that the U.S. would protect democracy in Taiwan so strong that Taiwan is regard throughout East Asia—including Beijing—as the thermometer of America’s commitment to democratic Asia against the pressures of undemocratic China. In this sense, to Taiwan, since democracy could enhance its international image to the U.S. and to the Western world, it was reasonable to Taiwan to change its type identity in order to maintain its personal identity. In addition to this current democratic and capitalist feature of the Lockean culture, there is also a tendency to balance power and to be guided by a self-help policy. In that regard, due to the Nixon–Kissinger deal to play an “enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend” China off the Soviet Union, Taiwan lost recognition as a nation internationally (NAVARRO, 2016).

Lasater (1993) points out that mainly because of the U.S. Cold War agenda, Washington attached far greater value to strategic relations with mainland China, which could serve as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, than with Taiwan. As a result, during the 1970s and much of the 1980s the importance of Taiwan to US. interests declined. In this perspective, Taiwan became almost an embarrassment to some in the United States. Nonetheless, if Taiwan was for some an embarrassment, for many it was a “bargaining chip”. In this respect, Navarro (2016) contends that the White House has periodically been using Taiwan in a game of amoral realpolitik and “realeconomik” to woo and placate China, and the “three communiqués”23 are good examples of this position.

Therefore, the U.S. policies toward Taiwan is pragmatic-oriented, as it is common in the Lockean culture. In this sense, many scholars took into account the U.S. interests in Asia and developed guiding principles concerning the U.S. relation with Taiwan. Navarro (2016) is

\[^{23}\text{Thian-Hok (1999) advocates that the three communiqués of 1972, 1979, and 1982 together have contributed to the increasing international isolation of Taiwan.}\]
one of them, and he raises three points that the U.S. must never do. First, he claims that American leaders should never refer to Taiwan as a “nation” or “country”. However, they should recognize it as a “democracy” and “political entity,” thereby signaling Taiwan’s *de facto*, although not *de jure*, independence. Secondly, according to him, American leaders should never acknowledge the “One China, Two Systems” policy, and they should avoid referring to the “One China” policy. Finally, both Congress and the White House must stop publicly acknowledging the need to appease China in the consideration of any arms sales to Taiwan, thus respecting the TRA, which grants Taiwan a special military partnership with the United States.

Similarly, Kelly (2004) points out four core principles regarding Taiwan status. First, the U.S. has to remain committed to China policy based on the three Joint Communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act. Second, the U.S. must not support independence for Taiwan or unilateral moves that would change the status quo. In his words: “For Beijing, this means no use of force or threat to use force against Taiwan. For Taipei, it means exercising prudence in managing all aspects of cross-Strait relations. For both sides, it means no statements or actions that would unilaterally alter Taiwan's status.” (KELLY, 2004, p. 64). Third, the U.S. must continue to sell defensive military equipment to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. Finally, the U.S. must maintain its capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion against Taiwan.

Another scholar who sets principles that should guide American policy toward Taiwan is Tkacik (2007). According to him, since the global expansion of democracy is a pillar of American foreign policy in Asia to the U.S., the United States should be committed to three courses of action in this regard. First, the U.S. should counter Beijing’s efforts to isolate Taiwan by strengthening U.S.–Taiwan trade ties and by encouraging other democracies to include Taiwan to join their efforts in international agendas such as health, transport, nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and humanitarian relief efforts. Second, the U.S. should be committed to the survival of Taiwan as a democracy regardless of China’s territorial claims. Finally, the U.S. should bolster Taiwan’s offensive military capacities, not only its defensive system.

Together with self-help system and balance of power, another important feature of the Lockean culture is the mutual recognition of sovereignty. In this sense, as explored in earlier this chapter, the U.S. does not recognize Taiwan as a nation since 1979. However, as Thian-Hok (1999) contends, the TRA grants Taiwan unofficial but friendly and close relations with the United States. Moreover, Thian-Hok affirms that the U.S. acknowledges China's position
that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China, nevertheless, U.S. does not recognize China’s claim on Taiwan yet. According to him, the distinction between acknowledgment and recognition lies in the TRA and the three communiqués documents.

Finally, this Lockean culture involving Taiwan and the U.S is important from the Taiwanese perspective because, as Navarro (2016) argues, the U.S. can help Taiwan to integrate as many international organizations as possible, which ameliorates Taiwan’s international status. Furthermore, as initiated in in the previous topic, because of the relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan and Taiwan’s democratization, The United States intervened in Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-1996. In this regard, Tang (2011) points out that U.S. role as a guardian of democracy not only implies responsibility but also capacity. The next topic will explore the Lockean and Hobbesian cultures of anarchy in this triangular relationship U.S.-China-Taiwan a little further.

3.2.3 Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-1996: the Hobbesian and the Lockean cultures in clash during Taiwan’s democratization

According with the definition of democracy used in this work, Taiwan was not a democracy in 1996 yet. Although democratically elected, Lee Teng-hui belonged to the ruling party of Taiwan at that time (KMT), that is to say that transition of power did not occur in 1996 elections (KO, 2004). Even though, to hold presidential elections is an important step of democratization. Consequently, since China does not recognize Taiwan as an autonomous being, a feature of the Hobbesian culture, it tried to stop Taiwan’s democratization. That is because, narratively, democracy and independence go hand in hand (TANG, 2011). Conversely, due to the self-help system and pragmatic reasons, the U.S. made the necessary efforts to protect Taiwan, thus operating in a Lockean logic. These Hobbesian and Lockean effects toward Taiwan can be seem in the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96.

Whiting (2001), in his study of China’s use of force from 1950 to 1996, shows that the tension in Taiwan Strait in 1995-96 follows some of the patterns of others Chinese conflicts, however, it is distinguished from these conflicts in many ways. Concerning Chinese military patterns, Whiting examined military doctrine manifest in historical writings and those of Mao Zedong that emphasize seizing the initiative. He also studied verbal warnings and patterns of deployment by People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and these armed forces, in each case,

24 As explored in chapter two, modern democracy has two criteria. First, the extension of the right to vote to at least 50% of male population. Second, a government chose by periodical elections. (HUNTINGTON, 1991)
indicated the intent to support deterrence and coercive diplomacy. Whiting also assessed, though through limited evidence as himself acknowledges, the level of deliberate risk-taking and risk management by the Chinese government.

The tensions in Taiwan Strait began in May 1995. On that occasion, Lee Teng-hui, former president of Taiwan, contrary to Washington’s assurances to Beijing, received a visa to visit Cornell University. In June, at this university, Lee gave a speech emphasizing the international status of Taiwan, which initiated a wave of rhetorical attacks from Beijing, followed by missile exercises north and south of Taiwan. At the end of July, China intensified the threats. In this regard, the PLA fired missiles 80 miles northeast of Taiwan in a 10-nautical mile circular area near the air-and sea-lanes between Japan and Taiwan. China had two main objectives with this aggression: First, to warn Washington against further support for Lee; second, to deter Lee from continuing his perceived moves toward Taiwan independence (WHITING, 2001)

In November 1995, Chinese government warned about another round of exercises prior to and coinciding with Taiwan’s presidential election. In this regard, after one month of deployments, Beijing scheduled missile exercises for March 8–15 during Taiwan’s three-week campaign period. At that time, these deployments included elements from all three PLA fleets, an estimated 300 planes, and 150,000 troops. The target areas were one 32 miles from the southwest coast and the other 22 miles from the northeast coast, and each one of these areas contained a major port and a naval base. In Chinese announcement, these military actions would be “exercises”, which is different from the 1995 “tests”. (WHITING, 2001)

The response from Washington came on March 8, 1996. The U.S. government announced a deployment of the USS Independence aircraft carrier battle group just a few hundred miles from Taiwan. This aircraft carrier contained two destroyers, a cruiser, and a frigate. On March 9 China replied to this announcement by reporting that a second air, land, and naval exercise in a 17,000-square-kilometer area off southern Fujian and near the midline in the Taiwan Strait would happen from March 12 to 20. In response, on March 11 Washington ordered a second carrier battle group headed by the USS Nimitz, two destroyers, a cruiser, a frigate, and a submarine from the Arabian Sea to join the Independence off Taiwan. This U.S. action did not stop PLA joint-force exercises, which, on March 12, began as scheduled. (WHITING, 2001)

On March 15 New China News Agency announced a third set of exercises from March 18 to 25. These exercises would end two days after Taiwan’s election and they would cover 6,000 square kilometers around Haitan Island off the Fujian coast, where amphibious boats,
helicopters, and parachute forces would combine with the land, air, and naval forces to
practice seizure of this island. Politically, China did not achieve some of its goals with these
military exercises. In this regard, a majority of 54 percent democratically elected Lee. On the
other hand, China reached one important goal, which was to avoid Taiwan from declaring
independence. In this matter, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the Taiwanese party
that had Taiwan’s independence as its main political project at the time, was defeated with
only 21 percent of the vote. (WHITING, 2001)

Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96 differs from the patterns of Chinese use of force in at
least three ways. First, the initial exercises of 1995 were not preemptive, what differs from the
pattern of China’s use of force. By contrast, they responded to the granting of a U.S. visa to
Lee and Lee’s provocative remarks at Cornell University. Second, the later exercises
attempted coercive diplomacy on Taiwan voters through threatening the use of force,
however, China did not specify the precise condition or circumstances that would bring it
about. Finally, the PLA remained limited to live-fire exercises that did not engage Taiwan or
U.S. forces. This absence of actual combat by the PLA differentiates these tensions in the
Taiwan Strait from the previous conflicts like, for example, the one in Korea (1950), or in
Taiwan Strait (1962), or the attack on Vietnam (1979). (WHITING, 2001)

Nevertheless, PLA’s military exercises did affect Washington. In this sense,
Washington prompted the largest deployment of force toward Taiwan since 1958. In addition,
this crisis triggered diplomatic communications that ultimately led to an exchange of summit
visits in 1997 and 1998. This U.S. response occurred even with a very careful risk
management from China. In mid-1995, China explicit scheduled missile firings and the
warned about its exercises. Moreover, missiles fired did not come close to Taiwan.
Furthermore, Beijing took several steps to inform Washington that no attack on Taiwan was
planned, which did not happen in all of the previous cases. The authoritative high-level
communication was undertaken with the objective of minimizing misunderstanding between
Washington and Beijing. (WHITING, 2001)

As Whiting (2001) points out, Taiwan is a valuable economic asset. In this regard,
destroying Taiwan for a subsequent reunification would be a Pyrrhic victory. For this reason,
China may have limited its use of force toward Taiwan. Another explanation for the limitation
of China’s force, however, has to do with the U.S. Whiting argues that a Chinese pattern is
deterrence and seizing of the initiative in the direct or indirect confrontation with the U.S. In
this sense, China avoids military conflict with the U.S. due to the asymmetry of power of
these two countries. Therefore, although China does not recognize Taiwan as an autonomous
being, it limits, not willingly, its violence toward Taiwan as the Taiwan Strait crisis has shown.

This Chinese self-restriction in using its force occurs mainly because of the Lockean relationship between U.S. and Taiwan, as addressed in the previous topic. Having an unofficial but close ally capable of protecting its personal identity is not only imperative to Taiwan; the U.S. also have many interests in the region, since the U.S. is regarded both as a promoter and defender\(^{25}\) of democracy (HUNTINGTON, 1996). In this sense, Tkacik (2007) claims that a political union of Taiwan with China would be contrary to U.S. interests. According to him, what serves to the U.S. interests concerning Taiwan’s status is keep it as \textit{de facto}, although not \textit{de jure} independent state.

This self-restriction in the use of force, however, was not what China wanted. After Lee’s speech emphasizing the international status of Taiwan in 1995, China responded with military threats. Thus, there was a direct relation between democracy-independence-Chinese perception of threat to its sovereignty in this case. This Chinese perception of threat was responded with an increase in the military tensions by the Chinese government in November 1995 to March 1996. In this period, the U.S. responded militarily too, both to protect Taiwan’s democratization as well as its interests in the region, as predicted by the Lockean logic. In sum, the external factors concerning the Hobbesian and Lockean cultures had a great influence in Taiwan’s democratization. They helped Taiwan to minimize its structural problems to democratization. The next section, therefore, will address this issue by putting in evidence these elements that contributed to the change of Taiwan’s type identity.

3.3 THE TURN POINT IN TAIWAN’S CHANGING TYPE IDENTITY

As explained in chapter one, states’ type identities are defined in terms of membership rules, and these rules vary both culturally and historically. The characteristics that underlie type identities are at base intrinsic to actors. In this sense, when an actor performs as a democratic state, this actor should not need external assistance in order to maintain it. For instance, Japan became a democracy because of the pressure of the United States, however, it sustains a democracy due to its own interests. With respect to the international system, type identities of states correspond to “regime types” or “forms of states”, such as democratic, authoritarian, and monarchic. (WENDT, 1999).

\(^{25}\) Wendt (1999) regards this U.S. interest in protecting democracies abroad as a role identity.
Taiwan’s type identity changed through the years from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. According to Ko (2004), Taiwan, in a decade and a half, peacefully moved from the rule of martial law in 1987 to become a full-fledged democracy. For him, this transition “has been accurately described as the first democratic transition of power in China's 5,000-year history.” (p. 137). Diamond (2001), when analyzing Taiwan’s democracy, wrote that after the election of the DPP in 2000 Taiwan was a democracy by any measure. For instance, he presents Freedom House data and sees that it rates Taiwan a 1 on political rights and a 2 on civil liberties26, which gives an average score of 1.5 that is sufficient to freedom classify Taiwan as a liberal democracy.

Indeed, Taiwan’s democratization was fast. In this regard, in 1991 the Taiwanese people elected for the first time the representatives to the National Assembly. In 1992, Taiwanese people elected the members of the Legislative Yuan for the first time, which provoked the split of KMT. Taiwanese people elected the Provincial Governor for the first time in 1994, and, in this same year, they elected the Mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung for the first time since 1964 and 1977 respectively. In 1996, this democratic movement reached the head of the executive power and Taiwanese people elected their president. Finally, in 2000, the first democratic transition of power in China's 5,000-year history took place in Taiwan. (KO, 2004)

The changes in the prestige of democracy help to explain this rapid Taiwan’s democratization. The regime types of forms of states, which are forms of membership of the international system, varies both culturally and historically, and democracy is becoming a dominant model of state’s type identity (WENDT, 1999). In this line, Fukuyama (1992) have argued that liberal democracy and a market-oriented economy was the last form of government of humankind. Thian-Hok (1999) contends that the democratization and Taiwanization is a force that could help Taiwan in determining its future in spite of China’s military and political pressure. Moreover, a more intense and democratic participation of Taiwan in the international system can improve its status (NAVARRO, 2016). For Tang (2011), when it comes to Taiwan, discourses concerning democracy go hand in hand with discourses about independence.

This rapid transition was motivated by other external factors like the Hobbesian and Lockean cultures. Tkacik (2007) claims that Taiwan’s independence means war according to the Chinese perspective. Perhaps because of this, many in Taiwan prefer the status quo of a de

26 Both scales ranging from 1, most free, to 7, least free. (DIAMOND, 2001)
facto independence than a de jure independence (KELLY, 2004). As was explored in previous sections, Taiwan’s subjective interests aiming at maintaining its personal identity regards democracy as a way to safeguard its existing autonomy. In this sense, the U.S. provides Taiwan military protection both as a virtual ally and a defender of democracy in the world (TKACIK, 2007).

To Ko (2004), Taiwan democratized in spite of U.S. efforts. According to him, the U.S. helped in Taiwan’s democratization only in providing military assistance and economic aid, all the other causes of democracy in Taiwan was given by internal elements. Nonetheless, even Ko states that: “Taiwan's decade of crisis brought upon by U.S. betrayal ended up forcing the KMT to push for more democratic reform to both appease the masses and regain international favor.” (p. 148). In this view, the KMT push for democratization was encouraged by the U.S. acknowledgment of the right of mainland China over Taiwan to the detriment of Taiwan itself. This U.S. betrayal could be interpreted as a self-help policy, which is quite common in the Lockean anarchy.

Moreover, Ko (2004) also acknowledges that, though not as strong as it could be, the U.S. did some efforts to the implementation democracy in Taiwan. In this regard, for him, the U.S. Congress constantly asked for democracy in Taiwan during the 1970s and 1980s, and this demand culminated in the call that the U.S. Congress on the KMT to lift martial law in 1986. Taiwan’s democracy, however, has to have intrinsic characteristics to Taiwan in order to be regarded as type identity. In this respect, Ko’s ideas are very relevant. As a matter of fact, Taiwan’s democratization did not occur in accordance with the U.S. agenda of transition to democracy.

Therefore, in this sense, Taiwan implemented local elections first and slowly moved toward national elections. Contrary to this course of action is U.S. foreign policy of encouraging democratization endorses the need to implement national elections first. Furthermore, Taiwan’s economic development arose out of thirty years of economic protectionism, which is just the opposite of the current U.S. foreign policy that universally pushes for short-term economic liberalization. In addition, authoritarianism led Taiwan to economic stability, which confronts the U.S. belief that democracy is the best system to produce wealth. Finally, KMT promoted democracy to benefit its own interests as a party. In this sense, it needed to appease internal masses that was struggling for rights and it also needed to gain international favor in order to not be replaced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). (KO, 2004)
In addition to these events, Ko (2004) observes that there are intrinsic characteristics of Taiwanese culture that are favorable to democracy. For him, Sun Yat-sen is a spiritual father that inspired democracy in Taiwan. In this regard, Sun Yet-sen established the Three Principles of the People, which are nationalism, democracy, and social welfare. Sun Yet-sen, according to Ko, provides philosophical legitimacy for democracy in Taiwan. Moreover, Ko is in line with the compatibility argument. He writes that “although Confucian values may have provided for a political stability that delayed the transition to democracy in Taiwan, there are aspects of Confucianism that are not only compatible with democracy, but in fact foster it.” (KO, 2004, p. 167). Ko’s view on Confucianism are divergent from the position held in the chapter two of this work, which is that Confucianism do poses some problems to democratization - structural problems.

In this line of reasoning, although Taiwan has changed its type identity by becoming a democracy in order to keep its autonomy, structural problems in Taiwan’s democracy were not extinguished. For instance, Diamond (2001) raises five key problems of Taiwan’s democracy. One of these problems is that “democracy and democratic values remain to be consolidated at the level of mass public opinion.” (p. 4). In this sense, Zhu (2005, p. 46) points out that Taiwan is “one of the few new democracies in East Asia where more people were skeptical about democracy than believed in its superiority”. This low level of popular support for democracy in Taiwan is related to the belief that the rule of a group of intellectual elites can problems such as corruption, unemployment, low economic growth and social disorder.

To conclude, skepticism about democracy in Taiwan increased in the late of 2001 because it has not necessarily altered Taiwan’s international status in any fundamental way (ZHU, 2005). Therefore, despite the internal elements that favor Taiwan’s democratization, the external factors were as much as important or even more important to that democratization. In this sense, they influenced Taiwan in changing its type identity from authoritarianism to democracy. Moreover, they still help in keeping democracy alive since democracy in Taiwan is still regarded as a fragile model of government.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

This work attempted to answer the following question: Why did Taiwan become a democracy despite the cultural obstacles to implementing it in a Confucian civilization? Searching for answers, this research started from the hypothesis that the more Taiwan become democratic, the more it will benefit from the Lockean culture, and the less it will suffer from the Hobbesian anarchy. In other words, this study initially assumed that Taiwan’s democratization would minimize its conflicts with China mainly because democracy would bring to Taiwan both international legitimacy from the international system, especially Western countries, and military protection, notably from the United States.

The hypothesis was partially confirmed. On the one hand, inferences have shown that Taiwan’s democracy really brought benefits to it from the Lockean anarchy. In this sense, Taiwan’s democracy strengthened the already existing Taiwan Relations Act, which delineates key aspects of the U.S. relations with Taiwan such as de facto diplomatic relations, the U.S. aid in modernizing Taiwan’s military defense, the U.S. interests in a peaceful resolution of Taiwan question and so on (WHITING, 2001). This commitment with an almost outdated act is due to the fact that the U.S. is not only a promoter of democracy around the world but it also is known as a defender of democratic regimes (NAVARRO, 2016). Democracy and capitalism are the dominant states’ type identities after the Cold War. Moreover, the Lockean culture presupposes that states will orient themselves toward a self-help system, thus, because of a pragmatic rationale of defending its interests in Asia, the U.S. protects Taiwan.

On the other hand, the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996 has demonstrated China’s will to use force in order to accomplish its political goals in Asia. Therefore, China approaches Taiwan following similar military patterns that it used in other conflicts such as the one in Korea (1950), or in Taiwan Strait (1962), or the attack on Vietnam (1979). These patterns regard the intent to support deterrence and to use coercive diplomacy. However, when it comes to preemptive attacks or an extensive mobilization of the People’s Liberation Army, China uses different military tactics like risk-taking and risk management. In summary, even with the U.S. military protection, China uses force against democratic movements in Taiwan (WHITING, 2001). This may occur because the narratives about democracy and independence are closely related (TANG, 2011).

As an explanatory case study this work sought the causal relationship between external factors and Taiwan’s democratization. Therefore, it attempted to find external elements
interacting with Taiwan’s personal identity and interests that were responsible to influence a move from authoritarianism regime to a relatively liberal democracy from 1991 to 2001. Those external factors were changing Taiwan’s type identity within this period, thus minimizing its structural problems concerning democratization.

According to the Wendtian literature, objective interests are those are related to the reproduction of an identity. In this regard, Taiwan has become democratic aiming at reproducing its autonomy, economic well-being, collective self-esteem, and at guaranteeing its physical survival, in other words, Taiwan aimed at defending its personal identity. By contrast, subjective interest is about how states think they can reproduce their identity, thus they have to do with motivations. In this sense, this research has developed a hypothesis of five points concerning states risking to lose their personal identity as follows:

1) They tend to conform their type identity to the type identity of other state or states able to protect or legitimate the more important aspects of their personal identity;
2) The more important aspects of their personal identity will be given mainly by their culture and historical processes; or, in other words, by how their ontologies as states have been constructed.
3) The pursuit to fit another type identity to save their personal identity is a subjective interest. This means that perceive the Other as able to accomplish such a task, which does not mean, however, that the Other objectively can do it or is willing to do it. This subjective interest will increase to the extent that the states perceive that the other state or states also have subjective interests concerning them.
4) This tendency to change their type identity will end when their subjective interests regarding how to reproduce their personal identity change; or when their personal identity change - which is more difficult to occur.
5) This hypothesis of conforming the Self’s type identity to the Other’s type identity is unlikely to function between states sharing an environment of enmity - the Hobbesian anarchy. This happens because in the logic of this anarchy the Other is not subjectively interested in protecting the identity of the Self since it does not recognize the Self as an autonomous being. This research did not gather enough data for evaluating this hypothesis in a Kantian culture.

Due to limitations of time to develop a broader and more inclusive research regarding some additional independent variables, this study did not test all the elements of the
hypothesis elaborated in its end in the systematic way that it demands. Nevertheless, it does provide tools for understanding Taiwan’s democratization. In this regard, this work has inferred that:

1) Taiwan is changing its type identity to conform the U.S. democracy because the U.S. is capable of protecting its personal identity, especially its *de facto* independence - or autonomy - and its physical survival;

2) Due to historical processes, like the Hobbesian environment between China and Taiwan since 1949, Taiwan is more likely to conform the U.S. type identity than China’s. By culture criteria, however, Taiwan has more affinity with China, which can explain the existing structural problems to implement the U.S. type identity into it;

3) The fact that democracy has become a dominant form of type identity in the Lockean culture after the Cold War along with the perception of the U.S. as a promoter of democracy around the world influenced Taiwan to change its type identity. Nonetheless, this subjective interests may not have objective results. There are limits to U.S. capacity or interest in protecting Taiwan from China. Taiwan was relatively certain that the U.S. would help it during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-1996 due mainly to the U.S. own interests in the region;

4) Many people in Taiwan became skeptical about democracy after Taiwan’s democratization because of unemployment and low economic growth. If this perception generalizes, Taiwan will prefer to return to authoritarianism in other to protect others aspects of its personal identity such as the economic well-being;

5) The U.S. and Taiwan were not in a Hobbesian culture during the timeline analyzed here. Perhaps that is why the hypothesis could function.

Finally, it is worth highlighting that although this hypothesis was developed in order to explain Taiwan’s democratization, it may be extensible to states sharing similarities with Taiwan. For instance, pariah states are also actors risking to undermine important aspects of their personal identity. There are, however, two differences between Taiwan’s case and the pariah states that must be taken into account. The first one is that most of the pariah states are embedded in a Hobbesian anarchy. Second, though many of them are not recognized as legitimate to many peers, they are, at least, recognized as states, in other words, there is no doubt about their personal identities as such, an issue that calls for attention considering the possible externalities that stem from this complex scenario.
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